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Abstract
Along with the rapid development of intelligent information age, users are
having a growing interaction with smart devices. Such smart devices are
interconnected together in the Internet of Things (IoT). The sensors of IoT
devices collect information about users’ behaviors from the interaction be-
tween users and devices. Since users interact with IoT smart devices for the
daily communication and social network activities, such interaction gener-
ates a huge amount of network traffic. Hence, users’ behaviors are playing
an important role in the security of IoT smart devices, and the security
aspects of Human-Computer Interaction are becoming significant.
In this dissertation, we provide a threefold contribution: (1) we review
security challenges of HCI-based authentication, and design a tool to de-
tect deceitful users via keystroke dynamics; (2) we present the impact of
users’ behaviors on network traffic, and propose a framework to manage
such network traffic; (3) we illustrate a proposal for energy-constrained IoT
smart devices to be resilient against energy attack and efficient in network
communication.
More in detail, in the first part of this thesis, we investigate how users’
behaviors impact on the way they interact with a device. Then we review the
work related to security challenges of HCI-based authentication on smart-
phones, and Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI). Moreover, we design a tool to
assess the truthfulness of the information that users input using a computer
keyboard. This tool is based on keystroke dynamics and it relies on machine
learning technique to achieve this goal. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work that associates the typing users’ behaviors with the produc-
tion of deceptive personal information. We reached an overall accuracy of
76% in the classification of a single answer as truthful or deceptive.
In the second part of this thesis, we review the analysis of network traf-
fic, especially related to the interaction between mobile devices and users.
Since the interaction generates a huge amount of network traffic, we propose
an innovative framework, GolfEngine, to manage and control the impact
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of users behavior on the network relying on Software Defined Networking
(SDN) techniques. GolfEngine provides users a tool to build their security
applications and offers Graphical User Interface (GUI) for managing and
monitoring the network. In particular, GolfEngine provides the function
of checking policy conflicts when users design security applications and the
mechanism to check data storage redundancy. GolfEngine not only pre-
vents the malicious inputting policies but also it enforces the security about
network management of network traffic. The results of our simulation under-
line that GolfEngine provides an efficient, secure, and robust performance
for managing network traffic via SDN.
In the third and last part of this dissertation, we analyze the security
aspects of battery-equipped IoT devices from the energy consumption per-
spective. Although most of the energy consumption of IoT devices is due to
user interaction, there is still a significant amount of energy consumed by
point-to-point communication and IoT network management. In this sce-
nario, an adversary may hijack an IoT device and conduct a Denial of Service
attack (DoS) that aims to run out batteries of other devices. Therefore, we
propose EnergIoT, a novel method based on energetic policies that prevent
such attacks and, at the same time, optimizes the communication between
users and IoT devices, and extends the lifetime of the network. EnergIoT
relies on a hierarchical clustering approach, based on different duty cycle ra-
tios, to maximize network lifetime of energy-constrained smart devices. The
results show that EnergIoT enhances the security and improves the network
lifetime by 32%, compared to the earlier used approach, without sacrificing
the network performance (i.e., end-to-end delay).
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) studies the interaction between human
and computer [1]. Research in the area of HCI is fascinating and complex. It
is fascinating because there are so many interesting questions and so many
challenges. It is complex because it involves human beings, whose behavior
is difficult to observe. In the research work presented in this thesis, we
focus on an interdisciplinary topic in HCI, called computer science-based
HCI [2], especially the security aspect of computer science-based HCI. We
deal with user authentication on smart devices relying on the network traffic
which is generated during the interaction between users and devices. Before
diving into the content of the thesis and its contributions, in this chapter,
we first introduce the research motivation and contribution, then we list the
publication during my Ph.D.
1.1 Research Motivation and Contribution
The topic of HCI becomes quite hot and interesting for researchers since
it involves new technologies. In the ubiquitous computing and smart tech-
nology age, smart devices are developing extremely fast and spreading all
around of our lives. Consequently, the interaction between users and smart
devices becomes more and more popular. Such interaction generates lots of
network traffic which can be used for analyzing users’ behavior and authen-
ticating users. Moreover, with the growing number of mobile devices and
IoT devices, a huge amount of network traffic is transmitted on the network.
We try to manage network traffic generated by HCI efficiently and securely
through a new paradigm Software Defined Networking (SDN). Finally, given
the scenario where an attacker conducts a DoS attack on energy-constrained
devices and run out of the battery, it is necessary to manage and extend
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the lifetime of communication among HCI related devices efficiently and
securely.
The research work presented in this dissertation includes several con-
tributions to the state-of-the-art of HCI security: (i) a tool for detecting
deceptive users via keystroke dynamics when users inputting through com-
puter keyboards; (ii) a framework to manage the HCI-related network traffic
more securely and efficiently via Software Defined Networking (SDN); and
(iii) a method for managing and optimize the energy consumption of a net-
work of battery-powered HCI devices to avoid energy attacks. We describe
our work in the following three main logical parts.
• Security Issues in User Interaction with Devices, studying the authen-
tication methods for smartphones and Brain-Computer Interfaces, and
especially designing a tool based on keystroke dynamics to infer de-
ceptive information.
• HCI impact on network traffic, focusing on a survey of HCI-related
network traffic analysis on mobile devices, and designing a secure and
efficient architecture for managing such network traffic.
• Energy efficient communication for IoT devices, proposing a method
for avoiding energy to be maliciously consumed and efficiently opti-
mizing the energy consumption of point to point communication.
In what follows, we briefly introduce each of the above parts, and summarize
our contribution. Besides, in this dissertation, some figures are re-used and
some essays are quoted from the work [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], for which the author
of this thesis is co-author.
1.1.1 Security Issues in User Interaction with Devices
Recently, users continuously carry smart devices and use them for daily
communication activities and social network interactions. Moreover, users
also manage personal data and handle private communications on smart
devices. Hence, it is necessary to use authentication methods to prevent from
the access of unauthorized users. The most used authentication methods on
mobile devices are based on the main secret (e.g., PIN, Graphical pattern,
Password, Fingerprint). However, they are not robust against some threats.
For example, from shoulder surfing [9] and smudge attacks [10], we can easily
recover the PIN and Graphical pattern. Even the knowledge of the secret
does not mean that you are legit users. Moreover, the fingerprint can be
easily faked. In order to cope with the shortcomings of authentication for
mobile devices, researchers proposed a new method called user behavioral
biometric authentication [11] that is more robust against the threats.
In the following, we first review HCI-based authentication for smart-
phones and the categorization of user behavioral biometric authentication.
2
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Then, we review the future of HCI (e.g., Brain-Computer Interfaces) which
provides the communication and activities between the devices and users’
brain. We study the security challenges in Brain-Computer Interface, in
particular, the aspect related to user authentication. Finally, we design a
specific tool based on dynamic keystrokes to detect the input of deceptive
information.
HCI-based Authentication for Smartphones
Nowadays, users start to develop a symbiotic bound with their smartphones.
On the one hand, users continuously carry smartphones with them and use
them for daily communication activities and social network interactions. On
the other hand, smartphones are enabled with sensors that are able to infer
not only information about the context (e.g., location) but also about its
owner. Since smartphones handle a huge amount of private information,
recent techniques rely on those sensing capabilities to authenticate the user,
measuring her biometric features. Instead of relying on a secret, biometric
authentication methods rely on physiological and behavioral characteristics
of the user.
Contribution: We review the most relevant biometric authentication
methods on smartphones proposed in the literature. We categorize the
HCI-based authentication methods by the nature of biometrics used, by their
temporal features and by the sensing capabilities they rely on. Moreover, we
divide the behavioral authentication methods into two categories according
to the number of times required to collect data from users and authenticate
them. Finally, we draw some future directions in this promising research
topic. Our review gives a very clear map for new researchers who want to
step into this field and do further study of user behavior authentication on
smartphones. This review is illustrated in Chapter 2.
HCI-based Security Challenges in Brain-Computer Interfaces
In order to help disabled people to improve their daily life and communi-
cation with other people, it is necessary to build a direct communication
between human brain and computer. This is known as Brain-Computer
Interfaces (BCI) [12]. BCI systems are deployed to manipulate the brain
activity to produce signals that can be used to control computers or com-
munication devices. BCI is becoming popular in medical and non-medical
areas. Unfortunately, manufacturers of BCI devices focus on application
development, without paying much attention to security and privacy issues.
Indeed, an increasing number of attacks on BCI applications underline the
existence of such issues. For example, malicious developers of third-party
3
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applications could extract private information of users. Therefore, the ro-
bust authentication on BCI is foremost important.
Contribution: We are the first to review security and privacy challenges
for BCI applications. In particular, we classify BCI applications into four
usage scenarios: 1) neuromedical applications, 2) user authentication, 3)
gaming and entertainment, and 4) smartphone-based applications. For each
usage scenario, we discuss security and privacy issues and possible coun-
termeasures. Especially, in the user authentication scenario, we survey the
work that leverages the brain activities as a special HCI-based authentica-
tion method. We believe that our classification will help new researchers in
this field to foster future research trends about user authentication for BCI.
This review is illustrated in Chapter 3.
Detecting Deceitful Users via Keystroke Dynamics
In the last ten years, keystroke dynamics has been widely used as a biomet-
ric measure for user authentication and user identification [13]. However,
in order to be able to recognize her, it requires a certain level of knowledge
about the alleged user and a specific training. For this reason, we focus on
a method that exploits the complexity of the cognitive mechanisms associ-
ated with the deceptive production to analyze the user responses. Since this
method is based on the general functioning of the human cognitive system,
it is possible to distinguish between fake and truthful personal information
provided by a user without any prior knowledge about the user who is declar-
ing data. The application of keystroke dynamics to differentiate truthful and
deceptive statements is a new field of study. So far, a very few number of
works in literature has analyzed the keystroke dynamics pattern associated
with the deception production [14, 15]. As far as we know, none has inves-
tigated the production of lies regarding of personal information. We believe
that a keystroke based deception detection tool could have great potential
for the application in online contexts, with a large number of purpose as
online baking security, prevention of FPA and so on. Moreover, it may be
administered quickly and remotely. The lie detection purpose is implicit, so
the typing rhythm can be used as a covert index to revealing deceptive be-
haviors [16]. Finally, while in other traditional tools for lie detection based
on human cognitive functioning the object of the falsehood is predetermined,
keystroke analysis offers the possibility to investigate free text contents.
Contribution: We propose a novel method, based on keystroke dynamics,
to distinguish between deceptive and truthful personal information when
users interact with a computer keyboard. Our method does not need any
prior knowledge about the user who is providing data. To our knowledge,
this is the first work that associates the typing human behavior with the
4
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production of lies regarding personal information. Via experimental analy-
sis, we assess that this method is able to distinguish between truth and lies
on specific types of autobiographical information, with an accuracy higher
than 75%. Specifically, for information usually required in online registra-
tion forms (e.g., name, surname and email), the typing behavior diverged
significantly between truthful or deceptive answers. According to our re-
sults, keystroke analysis could have a great potential in detecting the verac-
ity of self-declared information, and it could be applied to a large number
of practical scenarios requiring users to input personal data remotely via
keyboards. We present this tool in Chapter 4.
1.1.2 HCI Impact on Network Traffic
Since users interact with smart devices for the daily communication and so-
cial network activities, human interaction generates a huge amount of net-
work traffic. Moreover, through analyzing the network traffic by machine
learning, it can be widely used for authenticating users on mobile devices.
Hence, in this part, we talk about the HCI impact on network traffic. Espe-
cially, first, we survey all the literature related to network traffic analysis on
mobile devices. Then we design an innovative framework to manage such
huge amount traffic through a new paradigm Software Defined Networking,
in order to announce the security and efficiency of a network.
Analysis of Network Traffic on Mobile Devices
In recent years, mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) have met
an increasing commercial success and have become a fundamental element
of the everyday life for billions of people all around the world. Mobile
devices are used not only for traditional communication activities (e.g., voice
calls and messages) but also for more advanced tasks made possible by an
enormous amount of multi-purpose applications (e.g., finance, gaming, and
shopping). As a result, those devices generate a significant network traffic.
For this reason, the research community has been investigating security and
privacy issues that are related to the network traffic generated by mobile
devices, which could be analyzed to obtain information useful for a variety
of goals.
Contribution: We survey the state-of-the-art of network traffic analysis of
mobile devices. First, we categorize each work according to three criteria:
(i) the goal of the analysis; (ii) the point where the network traffic is cap-
tured; and (iii) the targeted mobile platforms. Especially, we provide further
discussion about the goal related to HCI. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to survey the works that analyze datasets of mobile traffic that
is either: (i) logged on one or more mobile devices; (ii) extracted from wired
5
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network traces; (iii) sniffed at one or more access points of a Wi-Fi network;
(iv) eavesdropped by one or more Wi-Fi monitors; (v) produced by one or
more mobile device emulators; or (vi) generated via a software simulation.
We believe that our classification will help new researchers in this field to
foster future research trends about human beings’ behavior. This survey is
reported in Chapter 5.
Network Traffic Management via SDN
Along with the popularity of the interaction between human and computer,
and the heterogeneity of devices, access protocols and current network infras-
tructure, the management of network traffic and smart devices are becoming
more and more vexing, since network administrators perform increasingly
sophisticated network management tasks. Moreover, if the network con-
figuration [17] is based on some advanced commands, it is error prone for
the users who rely on the Graphical User Interface (GUI) to manage and
operate the network. The two main causes of errors are the dynamically
changing network state and low-level network configuration. During the
last decade, researchers investigated Software Defined Network (SDN) as an
approach to aid administrators to manage and program their networks in
a more flexible way compared with other traditional network management
approaches. SDN functionally separates the network data plane from the
control plane. As a result, data plane devices act as a packet forwarding
device and leaving the decision making to a centralized system (i.e., control
plane). Despite SDN brings many advantages, such paradigm still presents
several open issues in terms of security, efficiency, and robustness.
Contribution: We propose an innovative framework named GolfEngine,
based on SDN, to simplify the management of network traffic and deploy-
ment of security applications to manage the user behavior. GolfEngine
enriches the state-of-the-art with the following contributions in terms of
components. The first component is “GolfEngine Platform”. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a system-level GUI in SDN
management architecture. Users can rely on an intuitive GUI to design
their own applications, check on-time network flows, run such applications,
and check the network topology in real-time. Moreover, the GUI design of
GolfEngine significantly simplifies the management of any abstract filtering
rules, minimizing at the same time the risk of network vulnerability due to
users’ misconfiguration. The second component is “Policy Conflict Detec-
tion (PCD)”, which guarantees users’ security applications to be conflicts
free. When a user uploads a new rule to the system, PCD automatically
checks policy contradictions and gives a warning to the user if it detects
a contradiction. We re-define relations and algorithms for contradictions
of two flow rules: rule1 and rule2. The proposed innovative analysis al-
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gorithms to implement discovering conflict assure the robustness, the cor-
rectness and the efficiency of GolfEngine. The third component is “Network
Statistic Coordinator (NSC)”, which is designed for improving the efficiency
of communication and lightening the load between controller and switches.
The results of our simulation underline that GolfEngine contributes signif-
icantly improving the efficiency and security of management HCI impact
on the network. The design and evaluation of GolfEngine are presented in
Chapter 6.
1.1.3 Energy-Efficient Communication of IoT Devices
The exponential growth smart devices with sensors and networking capabil-
ities have resulted in the development of Internet of Things (IoT) network
paradigm. Since an IoT network links smart objects to the Internet, IoT
smart devices are having an important role in improving users’ experience
and life quality. These devices with smart sensors can sense and collect the
user data related to Human-Computer Interaction. Some of HCI related de-
vices are battery-equipped and constrained by energy. They interact more
with users, they will have more energy consumption. Moreover, in some
cases, attackers excessive consuming the energy of energy-constrained de-
vices leads to no more data collected from users. For example, in a sce-
nario, an attacker injects DoS attacks into energy-constrained HCI related
devices, which consumes a lot of energy and leads the devices to run out
of battery. In order to be resilient against energy attack and efficient in
network communication, we analyze the security aspect of an IoT network
of battery-equipped HCI related devices from the energy consumption point
of view in Chapter 7.
Contribution: We propose EnergIoT, a hierarchical clustering approach
based on different duty cycle ratios, which adopts energetic policies to be
against energy attack and optimizes the communication among battery-
powered HCI related devices. First, we take the energy consumption of idle
listening into consideration not only in network construction phase but also
in data processing phase. Second, leveraging on the hierarchical clustering
structure, EnergIoT is able to balance the energy consumption in different
layers, and thus it avoids energy hole problem with assignation of different
duty cycle ratios for devices in different layers. Finally, as highlighted by
the results of the thorough evaluation we carried out, EnergIoT extends the
lifetime of a network of battery-powered IoT devices by 32% more than that
of uniform duty cycle approaches without decreasing network performance.
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1.2 Publications
Part of the research presented in this thesis and developed during my Ph.D.
program produced peer-reviewed workshop, conference and journal publica-
tions. The complete list of published and currently submitted works is listed,
in chronological order, in Section 1.2.1 (journal papers) and Section 1.2.2
(conference and workshop papers).
1.2.1 Journal Publications
[J1] Riccardo Spolaor, QianQian Li, Merylin Monaro, Mauro Conti, Lu-
ciano Gamberini and Giuseppe Sartori. Biometric Authentication
Methods on Smartphones: a Survey. In: Psychnology Journal, 14(2-
3):87-98, 2016.
[J2] QianQian Li, Sarada Prasad Gochhayat, Mauro Conti and FangAi Liu.
EnergIoT: A Solution to Improve Network Lifetime of IoT Devices. In:
Pervasive and Mobile Computing, in press, Elsevier, 2017.
DOI: 10.1016/j.pmcj.2017.10.005.
[J3] Mauro Conti, QianQian Li, Alberto Maragno and Riccardo Spolaor.
The Dark Side(-channel) of Mobile Devices: a Survey on Network
Traffic Analysis. Under submission at: Communications Surveys
and Tutorials, 2017.
Available as a scientific paper at https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.03766.
[J4] Merylin Monaro, Ciara Galante, Riccardo Spolaor, QianQian Li, Lu-
ciano Gamberini, Mauro Conti, and Giuseppe Sartori. Covert Lie De-
tection Using Keyboard Dynamics. Under submission at: Scientific
Reprot, 2017. (Minor Revision)
1.2.2 Conference and Workshop Publications
[C1] QianQian Li, Ding Ding and Mauro Conti. Brain-Computer Interface
Applications: Security and Privacy Challenges. In Proceedings of the
1st IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in Cybermatics (IEEE
CNS 2015 workshop: SPiCy 2015), pages 663-666, IEEE, 2015.
DOI: 10.1109/CNS.2015.7346884.
[C2] Merylin Monaro, Riccardo Spolaor, Qianqian Li, Mauro Conti, Lu-
ciano Gamberini and Giuseppe Sartori. Type Me the Truth! Detect-
ing Deceitful Users via Keystroke Dynamics. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Workshop Cyber Crime (ARES 2017 workshop: IWCC
2017), pages A60(1-6), ACM, 2017.
DOI: 10.1145/3098954.3104047
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[C3] Qianqian Li, Reza Mohammadi, Mauro Conti, Chuanhuang Li and
Xiaolin Li. GolfEngine: Network Management System for Software
Defined Networking. In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE International
Conference on Intelligent Computer Communication and Processing
(ICCP 2017), in press, IEEE, 2017.
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Chapter 2
HCI-based Authentication
for Smartphones
According to the participants surveyed in a TIMEs Mobility Poll [18], most
of the participants stated that they could not live a single day without their
smartphones. In detail, 91% of the participants say that their smartphones
are very important and, for 60% of them, even more important than coffee.
The pervasiveness of smartphones is generating a symbiotic bound between
the user and her smartphone. Lots of researchers put their effort in un-
derstanding users behavior using smartphones. Biometric authentication
methods move to this direction. Instead of relying on a secret, biometric
authentication methods rely on physiological and behavioral characteristics
of the user. Moreover, a smartphone is enabled with sensors that are able to
infer not only information about the context (e.g., location), but also about
its owner [19]. Since smartphones handle a huge amount of private infor-
mation, recent techniques rely on those sensing capabilities to authenticate
the user, measuring her biometric features.
Chapter Organization. The remaining of the chapter is organized as
follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce the background for the HCI-based
authentication on smartphones. Then we give a clear classification for the
HCI-based authentication methods in the literature in Section 2.2. Finally,
Section 2.3 discusses some possible future research directions in the field of
biometrics authentication methods on smartphones, while while Section 2.4
concludes this chapter.
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2.1 Background
Smartphones have become daily used personal devices. People use them for
both managing personal data and handling private communications. The
presence of such devices is now part of users’ everyday life, generating a sym-
biotic bound between the user and her smartphone. Hence, it is necessary
to use authentication methods to prevent the access to un-authorized users.
Non transparent methods (e.g., password, PIN) are the most commonly
used approaches. However, these methods require an aware interaction by
the user and a predefined secret, which can be easily uncover by an attacker.
Furthermore, even when in place, these methods often do not prevent a ma-
licious user to get access to the phone (e.g., answering to an incoming call).
Moreover, some users tend to avoid these types of authentication, since they
are not secure. Indeed, an attacker can uncover and require an explicit user
interaction. On the other hand, current transparent methods (e.g., keystroke
analysis) take a significant amount of time to authenticate the user, and they
cannot guarantee that an unauthorized user is blocked before she gets access
to the desired private data or service. For this reason, researchers focused
their efforts on designing authentication methods more precise, more usable
and less prone to attackers. Biometric authentication methods move to this
direction. Instead of relying on a secret, biometric authentication methods
rely on physiological and behavioral characteristics of the user.
Smartphones manufacturers (e.g., Samsung) have already expressed their
interests in such research topic [20]. Moreover, Biocatch [21] commercializes
software products based on cognitive traits (e.g., typical of eye-hand coordi-
nation, applicative behavior patterns, usage preferences, device interaction
patterns), physiological factors (e.g., left/right handedness, press-size, hand
tremor, arm size, and muscle usage) and contextual factors (e.g., device ID,
network, geolocation, transaction and navigation behaviors).
In order to protect information on a smartphone from being physically
accessed by attackers, a lot of authentication methods have been proposed in
recent years. We categorize the literatures by the way how they authenticate
users in the following section.
2.2 HCI-based Authentication Methods
Authentication methods are put in place to protect smartphones from being
accessed by un-authorized users. Common authentication methods that
are already deployed on smartphones leverage a secret information which
should be known only by the authorized user. Such methods are passwords,
Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) and unlock patterns. In recent years,
researchers proposed a lot of authentication methods. We categorize the
14
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HCI-based biometric authentication methods in the literature by the way
they perform the user authentication.
• Firstly, it is possible to categorize the authentication methods accord-
ing to the nature of the biometric features that are measured by smart-
phone sensors (schematized in Figure 2.1):
– Physiological biometrics: measure user’s body characteristics
(e.g., fingerprint, face).
– Behavioral biometrics: are metrics that build patterns ac-
cording to the way the user behaves with her mobile device (e.g.,
keystrokes dynamics, gait).
• Secondly, biometrics authentication methods can also be divided into
two main categories according to time required to collect data from
users and authenticate them:
– One-time authentication: requires the user to perform a spe-
cific task for a limited period of time (typically few seconds). In
order to not affect the user experience, an one-time authentica-
tion method needs to be as fast as possible, but at the same time
it must reach an high accuracy. For the same reason, such au-
thentication is performed only on privacy sensitive phases (e.g.,
smartphone unlock, access to bank account).
– Continuous authentication: involves the collection of data
from sensors for a long period of time. Practically, a continuous
authentication method performs two tasks at the same time: (i)
incrementally builds a behavioral profile of the user adding new
observations from sensors, (ii) verifies that the current observa-
tion matches with the behavioral profile of the user built from
the past observations.
It is worth of notice that, at the best of our knowledge, all physiological
biometric-based authentication methods in the literature belong to one-time
authentication category.
Another distinction that could be done is the one between implicit (or
transparent) and explicit (or non transparent) authentication methods. On
one hand, explicit authentication methods require the user to perform a
specific task, so the user is aware of when the authentication method is
taking place. On the other hand, implicit ones do not require the user to
perform any specific task to be authenticated.
2.2.1 Physiological Biometrics
Several authentication methods that rely on physiological biometrics are
already deployed on smartphones. As a first example of physiological bio-
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Figure 2.1: Biometrics authentication on smartphones.
metric, manufacturers recently started to embed on high-end smartphones
a specific biometric sensor for digital fingerprints. As another example, au-
thentication systems use the frontal camera in order to recognize the face or
the eyes of the owner. Hadid et al. in [22] propose a face and eye detection
and authentication for mobile phones. For the face detection, there are two
approaches: color based (fast but prone to illumination and background
changes) and Haar-like/AdaBoost based (slow but accurate). The first is
color-based face detection that is simpler, faster without robustness against
illumination and background changes. The second is Haar-like/AdaBoost
based Face Detection. The Haar-like features are extracted using the no-
tion of integral image, while AdaBoost is used to select the most prominent
features among a large number of extracted features and construct a strong
classifier from boosting a set of weak classifiers. This method proves to
be slower, but more effective and accurate. In [23], the authors propose a
standalone modular biometric system according to periocular information
to authenticate users on smartphones. In the first stage, this method makes
users to capture a probe periocular image with rear or front camera and
stores into the database for extracting features. The extracted features are
compared against all reference templates in the database, to obtain a com-
parison score which decides upon the access to the device. Ali Fahmi et al.
in [24] propose an authentication method that relies on the uniqueness of
the shape of human ear. Using the frontal camera, the method is able to
authenticate the user by the shape of her ear while she is taking a call. De-
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spite the prototype was not originally deployed on smartphones but it can
be extended also to them, Rasmussen et al. in [25] propose a pulse-response
biometric authentication method. Pulse-response biometric relies on the
property that each human body exhibits a unique response to a signal pulse
applied at the palm of one hand, and measured at the palm of the other.
Other researchers rely on a set of physiological biometrics at the same
time. Kim et al. in [26] propose an enhanced authentication method using
multi-modal personal information. The proposed approach collects informa-
tion from face, teeth and voice from smartphone sensors, and authenticates
users using these three traits simultaneously. Moreover, Boehm et al. in [27]
proposed a system for secure smartphones login with authentication com-
bining face recognition with gaze tracking. During the login, when a face
recognizer continuously checks the identity of the user, a number of icons
are displayed on the screen; as the icons move in incongruent line patterns,
the user follows her secret icon with her eyes.
2.2.2 Behavioral Biometrics
In this section, we report the most relevant authentication methods that use
behavioral biometrics. Some of them are not strictly designed for smart-
phones but they can be extended to work also on such mobile devices. We
first describe one-time authentication methods, then we proceed with con-
tinuous time ones.
One-time authentication methods
In the literature, some researchers rely on behavior of the user while she
inputs information on touchscreen. Giuffrida et al. in [28] propose a sensor-
enhanced keystroke dynamics authentication method. In other words, while
users input the password, the system authenticates them using both motion
sensors and taps on the touchscreen. The effectiveness of this authentication
method is also proved as secure even against the statistical attacks [29]. The
authentication method proposed by Zheng et al. in [30] is similar to [28].
However, the authors in [30] combine four features (acceleration, pressure,
size, and time) extracted from smartphone sensors as verification mechanism
to authenticate whether the user is the true owner of the smartphone or an
impostor who happens to know the password. Another method proposed
in [31] performs an implicit authentication where users are authenticated by
the way they perform the unlock pattern on touchscreen. De Luca et al.
in [9] proposed a method where users draw shapes (or gestures) on the front
and the back of smartphones to enter tap-based passwords. The sequence
and the way users draw the shape password is one kind of authentication
which is a good resistance against shoulder surfing attacks and is easy and
fast to use. This method also uses the habit they switch sides of the smart-
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phones as authentication which increases security while authentication speed
stays relatively fast. Another example of authentication with touchscreen is
proposed by Saevanee et al. in [32], where the authors use the finger pressure
on a touchscreen to authenticate the user. Other work in this direction uses
motion sensors to authenticate implicitly the user when she is answering or
placing a phone call [33], also called phone-to-ear gesture.
Continuous authentication methods
A behavioral biometric metric is user’s gait (i.e., the way she walks). The
authors in [34] test subjects’ gait while they wear an accelerometer device
on their belt. This method identity users with portable devices while they
walk with devices. Similarly, the method in [35] assumes that the smart-
phone is placed at the hip of each volunteer to collect gait data. Regarding
the user interaction with the touchscreen, Frank et al. in [36] propose a
continuous authentication method based on user interaction with smart-
phones’ touch-screen (i.e., updown and leftright scrolling). Similarly to the
one-time method [28], Gascon et al. in [37] propose a continuous authentica-
tion method that analyzes typing-motion behavior of users on smartphones.
The authors recruited participants to let them enter some short sentences
on a touchscreen while all available sensor events were recorded to build a
typing-motion behavior profile of the user. Some other methods consider
the context and location in which a mobile device is used. Shi et al. in [38]
present an implicit authentication, an approach that uses observations of
user behavior for authentication. The authors collect users behavior data
for two weeks when they use their smartphones as authenticating method.
These devices can collect a rich set of information, such as location, motion,
communication, and usage of applications. This implicit proves to be more
suited for mobile devices. The authors collected users’ behavior data from
their smartphones for two weeks in order to prove to the effectiveness of their
proposal. Another example of context inferring technique is CReˆPE [39], a
framework for enforcing fine-grained context-related policies, which can rec-
ognize the context in which a mobile device is used, continuously monitoring
the environment via phone sensors. This framework supports both physi-
cal contexts (i.e., location, time), which are associated with physical sensors
(i.e., GPS, clock, Bluetooth, etc.), and logical contexts, which are defined by
functions over physical sensors. The authors in [40] proposed a framework
to analyze encrypted network traffic and to infer which particular actions
the user executed on some apps installed on his mobile-phone. Conti et al.
in [33] investigated a new biometric measure to authenticate the user of a
smartphone: the movements the user performs when answering (or placing)
a phone call. The biometric measure leverages features that are becom-
ing commodities in new smartphones (i.e. accelerometer and orientation
sensors).
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2.3 Future Research Directions
Some possible future directions on continuous authentication methods can
rely on cognitive games or other sources of information such as external
devices and side-channels.
2.3.1 Cognitive Games
A possible future direction in one-time behavioral authentication consists of
measuring the behavior of the user while she solves cognitive games. Existing
cognitive game easily extendable for this purpose are cognitive CAPTCHAs
for touchscreen-enable devices, such as Capy Puzzle [41] and CAPTCHaS-
tar [42].
2.3.2 External Devices
An authentication method relies on an external devices to authenticate the
owner of a smartphone. Additional sources of information to improve the re-
liability of existing authentication methods could be external or wearable de-
vices, such as smartwatches, fitness wristbands or Google Glass devices [43].
In fact, such devices are embedded with sensors, thus they could be a source
of valuable information to infer behavioral patterns. In this work, we do not
consider other physiological biometrics such as blood and DNA. This be-
cause they require specific hardware that are not commercially available at
the current time, but it is reasonable to consider that such hardware could
be embedded into smartphones in a near future.
2.3.3 Side-channel Analysis
A side-channel is an observable source of information that is the result of
the way the user interacts with a device. Network traffic is an example
of side-channel and it could be relied on to build a behavioral profile of a
user. Some recent work shows that it is possible to infer from the encrypted
network traffic the set of apps installed [44] and even the actions the user
performs within an app [45]. Moreover, since Conti et al. prove that it is
possible to recognize a user from the energy consumption of her laptop [46],
it is reasonable to consider this side-channel on smartphones as a valuable
source of information for a user authentication method.
We strongly believe that it is possible to build an authentication method
combining multiple behavioral biometrics and evaluating their impact on
authentication dynamically, with an approach based on the context of usage.
We also believe that, in the future, biometric authentication methods will
significantly improve both the security and the usability of smartphones.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of authentication methods
on smartphones that are based on user biometrics. Firstly, we categorized
authentication methods in the literature according to the nature of the bio-
metric features, which are measured by smartphone sensors, into behavioral
and physiological biometric categories. Physiological biometrics are related
to body characteristics of the user, while behavioral biometrics are related
to the way a user interacts with her smartphone. Secondly, we divided the
behavioral authentication methods into two categories according to time
required to collect data from users and authenticate them (i.e., one time
and continuous authentication). Finally, we discussed some possible fu-
ture research directions in the field of biometrics authentication methods on
smartphones.
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Chapter 3
HCI-based Security Challenges in
Brain-Computer Interfaces
Brain computer Interface (BCI) is a communication system between the
brain and the external environment. It collects data related to users’ brain
activities through sensors and transfer this data to computers. In BCI sys-
tems, the brain does not use peripheral nerves in order to give orders to our
body. Instead, the orders are captured directly by BCI devices and encoded
into electro-physiological signals. These signals become commands that can
control external devices and computer applications. For example, in order
to control a cursor, signals are transmitted directly from the brain to the
application that moves the cursor, rather than taking the “route” through
peripheral nerves from the brain to the hand to move a mouse. This tech-
nology makes it easier for a human to communicate with computers or ex-
ternal devices, such as prosthetic devices (especially for the patients with
severe neuromuscular disorders). With the development of intelligentiza-
tion, BCI technology has been pervasive in several fields of our life, such as,
neuromedical field, authentication, gaming, entertainment, and marketing.
Unfortunately, BCI manufacturers are developing devices and applications
without taking much the security and privacy issues into account. Using
such devices, individuals’ private information could be stolen by malicious
third party applications. Hence, it is necessary to discover the security issues
on this new technology and make it better sever the authentication function.
Chapter Organization. The remainder of the chapter is organized as
follows. Section 3.1 describes background knowledge of Brain-Computer
Interface. In Section 3.2, we revise current state-of-the-art BCI applications
(i.e., neuromedical applications, authentication, gaming and entertainment,
and smartphone-based applications). Then in the following Section 3.3, for
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each application scenario we discuss the key security and privacy challenges
together with possible countermeasures. Finally, we make a summary of this
chapter in Section 3.4.
3.1 Background
In this section, we give background information of the working principle of
BCI, the classification of BCI system according to the security level, and the
BCI devices comparison. Figure 3.1 shows the working of brain-computer
interfaces. First, the brain neural signals are captured by BCI devices (step
1): this process is named signal acquisition. After signal acquisition, BCI
systems transform these analog signals into digital signals (step 2). Then,
using signal processing, the features are extracted and classified (step 3 and
step 4). Then, the signal output is sent to BCI applications (step 5).
1
3 4
5
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Figure 3.1: The work principle of BCI.
The brain has always fascinated human beings, and particularly a Ger-
man scientist named Hans Berger, who discover electroencephalography
(EEG) [47] about 80 years ago. After this, new methods for exploring it
have been found and we can categorize them into three main groups: inva-
sive, partial invasive and non-invasive. BCI systems could be classified into
three main groups: 1) invasive system [48], 2) partial invasive system, and
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3) non-invasive system. An invasive system requires physical implants of
electrodes into the grey matter of the brain by neurosurgery, which makes it
possible to measure single neurons or local field potentials. Partially invasive
system is another brain signal reading process which is applied to the inside
the skull but outside the grey matter, e.g., electrocorticography (ECoG). It
records the activity of the brain inside the skull, but on the surface of the
membranes that protects the brain. A non-invasive system (e.g., electroen-
cephalography - EEG, and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging - fMRI)
is the most frequently used neuron signal capturing method. This system
is applied to outside of the skull, just applied on the scalp. It records the
brain activities inside of the skull, and on the surface of the brain mem-
branes. Both EEG and fMRI give different perspectives and enable us to
“look” inside of the brain [49]. In EEG, brain-related electrical potentials
are recorded from the scalp. Pairs of conductive electrodes, are used to read
electricity. Note that, invasive and partial invasive systems are prone to
scar tissue, and they are difficult to operate. Furthermore, both of them
are quite expensive. Although EEG signals can be effected by noise and
signal distortion, they are easily measured and have good temporal resolu-
tion. Therefore, the most widely used method for recording brain activity
in BCI systems is EEG. EEG-based devices directly measure electrical po-
tentials produced by brain’s neural synaptic activities. Five waves from
human brain activities that could be captured by EEG devices are shown in
Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1: Brain waves.
Type Frequency (Hz) Normally
Delta 0.5 - 4 Hz hypnoidal
Theta 4 - 7 Hz slow wave sleep
Alpha 8 - 12 Hz stable wave
Beta 12 - 30 Hz action wave
Gamma Over 30 Hz arousal and excitement
Event Related Potential (ERP) is measured by means of EEG. An ERP
is detected as a pattern of voltage change after a subject responses to a
certain stimulus. Every ERP is time-locked to the stimulus, i.e., the time
frame at which an EEG voltage change is expected to occur is known given
the timing of the stimuli. The study of the brain in this way provides a
noninvasive means of evaluating brain functioning in patients with cognitive
diseases. Exposure to external stimuli, such as a tone or light flash, can
generate responses in the EEG wave. Internal stimuli, like skipping an
expected stimulus can also generate a response. In both cases this is called
Event Related Potentials (ERP). Currently several companies produce BCI
devices, for different purposes, ranging from clinical-grade BCI devices to
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consumer-grade BCI devices. Table 3.2 lists the main features of three
common devices, while Figure 3.1 shows the appearances of these devices.
Table 3.2: Comparison of BCI devices.
Device Price Electrodes Resolution Interface
BioSemi Active [50] $12000 256 24 bits Wired
Emotiv EPOC [51] $399-499 14 14 bits Wireless
NeuroSky [52] $50-150 1 8 bits Wireless
Figure 3.2: BCI devices.
3.2 BCI Applications
Brain-computer interface was first developed for assistance, especially for
the patients with severe neuromuscular disorders. More recently, however,
BCI have had a surge in popularity for non-medical uses, such as gaming,
entertainment and marketing. In this section, we classify BCI applications
into four different application scenarios according to their usage purpose
(i.e., neuromedical applications, user authentication, gaming and entertain-
ment, and smartphone-based applications). For each application scenario,
we provide a description.
24
Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects Q. Li
3.2.1 Neuromedical Applications
Since BCI technology makes it easier for a human to communicate with ex-
ternal devices or computers, it is widely used in the neuromedical area to
help patients to control their body through BCI devices instead of nerves.
BCI technology can help patients, especially with serve neurological disor-
ders, e.g., Parkinson disease. Several neural implantable devices [53] will be
available in the near future. Because of being closely related with health,
security and privacy concerns become especially necessary to be taken into
consideration. An example of neuromedical applications that might be ex-
posed to attacks is prosthetic limb application [54].
3.2.2 User Authentication
Authentication is a process that ensures and confirms a user’s identity. It
plays an important role in security systems. Technology advancing makes it
possible to easily obtain EEG signals. Using EEG brain signals as authen-
tication measure has been proposed in many literatures and proved to be
effective. Authors in [55] aim at authenticating users, based on brainwave
signals. In particular, they use single-channel EEG signals to do authenti-
cation. In this authentication system, BCI devices record brainwave signals
when a subject performs a custom task (e.g., singing, breathing or finger
movement). Then, brain signals are wirelessly transmitted to a computer
application which collect and process this data. Their authentication sys-
tem analyses the similarity between such brain data and training data to
authenticate subjects. The authors show that their proposed authentication
mechanism has the same accuracy as multi-channel EEG authentication,
about 99% accuracy. Similar to [55], authors in [56] take EEG brainwave
features as neural passwords to do authentication. The entire process is
performed automatically, without human supervision. The authors use an
algorithm that automatically extracts neural events corresponding to an
individual’s blinking, jaw-clenching, and eye-rolling activities. The results
show that accuracy of this authentication method ranges from 67% to 95%
with single-trial inputs.
3.2.3 Gaming and Entertainment
With the development of BCI technology, there are several BCI games avail-
able in entertainment industry [57] [58] [59]. The principle of most BCI
games works in a way similar to P300-speller. In this kind of games, an
amplitude peak in the EEG signal is detected at more or less 300ms after a
stimulus. In this kind of games, an amplitude peak in an EEG signal is be
detected at more or less 300ms after a stimulus. In the game P300-speller,
stimuli are alphanumeric characters shown on the screen. The characters
are arranged in a matrix where rows and columns flash on a screen in a rapid
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succession. According to the being spelled word, users choose one character
using eyes from the screen. Through analyzing peaks occurring in the brain-
waves, authors get the spelled word. In [60] the authors analyze the P300
BCI features in gaming applications and show that the P300 BCI even with
some shortcomings, not only exhibits relatively high speed and accuracy but
also can be used without user training, after a short calibration. In addition,
we list four classic P300-based BCI games here.
• MindGame [59]: In this game, the user moves a character from one
field to another on a game board. The length of the characters steps
depends on the BCI classifier output, with a stronger brain response to
target flashes leading to larger steps and the faster attainment of the
game goal, which is to visit all predetermined target fields. Unlike of
typical P300 BCI spellers, the stimuli are not presented group-wise (as
in rows and columns) but rather separately, one at a time (“single-cell”
or “single-character” design).
• Snake [61]: It is also based on the same principle of P300-speller. In
this game, a snake can move in three directions: forward, left and
right. The goal is to locate and eat apples on a map. Eating apples
makes the snake grow in length, and becomes as large as possible. For
the sake of having speed in the game, moving forward is automatic,
and both turning left or right is controlled by the user via EEG signals.
3.2.4 Smartphone-based Applications
The application scenario we want to consider in this subsection is actually
mainly driven by a specific emerging and pervasive technology, i.e., smart-
phones. Along with the advances in smartphone capabilities, there is an
increasing interest in using smartphone by individuals in their daily life.
BCI are used in conjunction with this technology (smartphone). Recently,
some BCI applications based on smartphone have been proposed in many
literatures. Authors in [62] implement a brain-controlled address book dial-
ing app, which works in a way similar to P300-speller. Instead of showing
characters in P300-speller, the dialing app shows a sequence of photos of
contacts from the address book. Therefore, the user can easily select a per-
son whom she or he wishes to dial. In this application, EEG signals from
the headset are transmitted wirelessly to an iPhone, which natively runs a
lightweight classifier to discriminate P300 signals from noise. When a per-
sons contact-photo triggers a P300, his/her phone number is automatically
dialed. Authors in [63] measure a subject’s attention and meditation level
through EEG signals when a subject is playing a game. Authors compare the
difference among all the subjects’ EEG signals, according to subjects’ age
and gender. Their results show that, in the POKOPANG game, the average
attention level of men is lower than that of women, while the meditation
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level is reversed. As a result, authors infer that women are more interested
in POKOPANG game. Air Brain system [64] is a portable EEG telemetry
system. Different from other portable EEG monitoring systems, in order
to have more storage space, this way, the stored data can be accessed from
everywhere. To achieve this, the system uses 3G network of smartphone to
transfer data. Air Brain system enables subjects to measure EEG signals
immediately after subjects start walking. Furthermore, the system is able
to detect eye closing by measuring changes of aplha wave.
3.3 BCI Security and Privacy Challenges
In this section, we describe possible attacks (either already doable, or envis-
aged to be possible in the near future) for the above scenario. Finally, for
each application scenario we also discuss possible countermeasures.
3.3.1 Neuromedical Applications
BCI devices in medical care industry could help patient with neurological
disorders, such as injury, spina bifida, stroke, encephalitis, multiple sclero-
sis, Parkinson disease, and Alzheimer disease. However, there exist some
attacks [53]. As a representative case of neuromedical applications, pros-
thetic limb application [54] and Deep Brain Stimulator [65] are two classic
applications. In what follows, we list possible attacks and countermeasures
for Neuromedical applications scenario.
Prosthetic Limbs
• Attack Model: Prosthetic limb application [54] allows physicians
to connect wirelessly to adjust settings of neural implant devices. If
complete brain neural signals are transmitted, an attack can intercept
the transmission, save brain neural signals, and decompose the raw
signals to obtain private information. An attacker could try to hijack
these signals to take control of the robotic limb or give dangerous
movement feedback to the patient. We underline that these attacks
are possible even when information is transmitted in an encrypted
format [40]. Furthermore, attacker could try to control prosthetic
limbs of patients and give dangerous movement to patients. Under
this condition, the attacker does not need to be near the patient but
only needs to have attack hardware placed near the patient. The
attacker could also infect the patient biotechnology components with
a digital virus. Another possible scenario is the case in which patients
are attackers who might modify settings on their own prosthetic limbs.
They might just want to override mechanical safety settings to gain
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extra strength or interfere with limb feedback to eliminate the ability
of feeling pain.
• Countermeasure: There are some appropriate safeguards in the de-
sign of the prosthetic applications which can be deployed in the com-
ing years. For these prosthetic applications used to give treatment for
patients, it is clear that the main countermeasures should focus on
preventing life-threatening attacks. Also, we should protect private
feelings and emotions of patients from being leaked to attackers. For
these prosthetic systems, it is necessary to guard against attackers try-
ing to prevent the patient from using the limb, particularly since this
can occur while the user is running, driving. In addition, these appli-
cations should prevent attackers from remotely eavesdropping on the
wireless signals and collecting private information about patients’ ac-
tivities. The communication between neural implantable devices and
patients must be kept confidential. Furthermore, if they are in sensi-
tive condition such as depression, trying to prevent wireless attackers
from detecting the presence of these implant devices is effective to pro-
tect safety. In the future, more effective countermeasures should be
proposed to guarantee that prosthetic applications are not only safe
and effective, but also these applications are robust enough to prevent
attacks.
Deep Brain Stimulator
• Attack Model: The Deep Brain Stimulator System (DBSs) is a vi-
bration tool that will assist medical doctors in determining the imple-
mentation site for the electrodes of a deep brain stimulator. Current-
generation DBSs has had success treating Parkinson disease, chronic
pain, and other medical conditions [66] [67] [68]. But these devices
are vulnerable to the attack. For example, patients may attempt to
modify setting to make themselves’ moods feel good, whereas attack-
ers may also attempt to program the stimulation therapy maliciously.
The attacker’s strategy does not need to be too complexed if they want
to cause harm. It can also even cause cell death or the formation of
meaningless neural pathways by bombarding the brain with random
signals. Alternatively, an attacker might wirelessly prevent the device
from operating as we want.
• Countermeasure: We must also ensure that DBSs protect the feel-
ings and emotions of patients from external observation. Furthermore
if he or she is receiving treatment for a socially sensitive condition such
as depression a patient might also want to prevent a wireless attacker
from detecting the presence of the DBS.
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In the future, more effective countermeasures should be proposed to guaran-
tee that neuromedical applications are not only safe and effective, but also
robust enough to prevent attacks.
3.3.2 User Authentication
Using EEG brainwaves to authenticate might result in risks for the privacy
of users.
• Attacks: Using EEG brainwaves to authenticate might result in risks
for the privacy of users. For example, authors in [69] propose an
authentication system that verifies an individual EEG signal when
a subject performs a custom task (e.g., singing, breathing or fin-
ger movement). They also design an attack model by impersonating
the thoughts of subjects. The authors make deliberate attacks from
thought impersonators to test the robustness of the authentication
system. Similar to [70], an adversary can attack the authentication
system via synthetic EEG signals, using EEG generative model based
on the historical EEG data from a subject can also attack the authen-
tication system [71].
• Countermeasures: To mitigate the authentication attacks men-
tioned about, a possible way is to reduce authentication error rate.
For example, we can enlarge the number of participants, use recruited
attackers, and integrate the data processing methodology with a real-
time authentication framework to achieve reduced authentication error
rate. The method in [69] is like the authentication of fingerprint. In or-
der to enhance this system robustness, the authors should increase the
number of test subjects, use recruited attackers, and integrate the data
processing methodology with a real-time authentication framework.
Moreover, the system maintedevelop data processing enhancements
that further reduce the authentication error rates in general. Chuang
and John in [72] propose one-step two-factor authentication. Two-step
verification does not mean two-factor authentication and two-step ver-
ification. These two factors are the knowledge factor and the inherent
factor. For example, reading the password is a well-established be-
havioral biometric that fits the one-step two-factor criteria. In this
method, when a user read a password (the knowledge factor), the sig-
nals when reading (the inherent factor) is also employed to authenti-
cate the user. Therefore, if using some more secret knowledge, the au-
thentication system will be more effective against attackers. Moreover,
another possible method to enhance the robustness of authentication
is by leveraging multidimensional method [73]. For example, using
multiple authentication signals (e.g., the signals of singing, breathing,
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or being shocked). Besides, we can combine the existing authenti-
cation methods on smartphone device to perform multidimensional
authentication.
3.3.3 Gaming and Entertainment
Brain-computer interfaces are becoming increasingly popular in the gaming
and entertainment industries. Martinovic et al. [74] highlight the existence
of side-channel attacks by malicious third-party games on BCI devices.
• Attacks: Similar to smartphone games, third-party BCI games de-
pend on common APIs to access BCI devices. Thus, such APIs supply
unrestricted access to raw EEG signals for BCI games. Furthermore,
such games have complete control over the stimuli that can be pre-
sented to users. As a consequence, attackers can display the con-
tents and read their corresponding EEG signals. The content might
be videos, pictures, or numbers, which users see when they playing
games. Therefore, attackers can specifically design some videos and
images shown to users in order to maximize the amount of leaked in-
formation. In particular, the impact of exploiting or mishandling BCI
devices is difficult to estimate. Authors in [74] demonstrate BCI games
could be exploited to extract individuals’ private information, such as
4-digit PINs, bank information, date of birth and location of residence,
using users’ recorded EEG signals.
• Countermeasures: Authors in [75] identify security and privacy is-
sues arising from possible misuse or inappropriate use of “Brain Mal-
ware” information. In particular, they propose an interdisciplinary
approach to enhance the security of BCI systems by the aid of several
experts from different areas, such as neuroscientists, neural engineers,
ethicists, as well as legal, security and privacy experts. Authors in [76]
propose a tool named “BCI Anonymizer” to prevent the side-channel
extraction of users’ private information. The basic idea of the “BCI
Anonymizer” is to remove private information from raw EEG signals
before this information is stored and transmitted. “BCI Anonymizer”
could be implemented either in hardware or in software, as a part of
BCI devices, but not as part of any external network or computa-
tional platform. Moreover, the “BCI Anonymizer” can generate an
anonymized neural signals to replace the removed signals that repre-
sent private information. However, authors in [76] do not provide a
clear method to distinguish the difference between users’ private in-
formation and commands to applications.
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3.3.4 Smartphone-based Applications
The smartphone-based BCI applications are prone to attacks that origi-
nate in the mobile device itself. Therefore, most of the possible attacks on
smartphone issues could also be considered as security and privacy issues of
smartphone-based BCI applications. These attacks could be considered as
internal and external attacks.
• Internal Attacks: Smartphone applications can access private data
which is acquired from BCI devices and stored in smartphones or SD
card. This data can be illegally transferred by a malware to a remote
server (e.g., privilege escalation attacks [77]). Developers of malwares
can analyse the private signals and attack the users of BCI devices.
Attacks to smartphone applications also apply to smartphone-based
BCI applications. Another attack is under the condition of FM Ra-
dio Data System (RDS), where the data channel connects all devices
(especially with smartphones) with FM radio receiver chips. Despite
the potential risk, RDS has been so far completely ignored by security
providers, as discussed in details in previous work [78].
• External Attacks: the potential attack could be from outside of
smartphones. As a presentative case, here we consider the FM Radio
Data System, RDS. Open and broadcast in nature, this data chan-
nel connects all devices with FM radio receiver chips, which are com-
mon for Android devices commercially available. Despite the potential
risk, RDS has been so far completely ignored by security providers, as
discussed in details in previous work [78]. Another kind of external
threats is based on the Man-In-The-Middle principle. When users ac-
cess the Internet by the public access point, the improper use of the
SSL protocol might cause attacks [79].
• Countermeasure: Given that we are considering BCI applications
in conjunction with a specific technology (smartphone), here counter-
measures are mostly the ones typical for generic smartphone security.
Useful security approaches could be the ones that track the flow of
information. For example, TaintDroid [80] proposes a model that can
track not only the way applications access sensitive data, but also the
way applications use such data. FlowDroid [81] proposes an inno-
vative and accurate static taint analysis for applications in Android
platform, allowing proper analysis to handle callbacks invoked by the
Android framework. In addition to the aforementioned approaches,
fine-grained context-based access control [39] is another effective way
to limit the leakage of private data. These mitigations are possible
only by modifying Android’s permission model, e.g., Android’s inter-
nal middleware layer. Moreover, we can modify the Android system
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permission model to prevent the external threats. To achieve this, the
middleware layer of Android architecture is needed to recode. Another
method is to prevent the external threats at application level, which
is easily deployed.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we review main common brain-computer interfaces (BCI)
applications, and their possible security and privacy issues. Moreover, we
consider four different application scenarios: 1) neuromedical applications,
2) user authentication, 3) gaming and entertainment, and 4) smartphone-
based applications. For each scenario we provide the description of current
state-of-the-art technologies, potential attacks that might threat each sce-
nario, and envisaged countermeasures.
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Chapter 4
Detecting Deceitful Users via
Keystroke Dynamics
In recent decades, interacting remotely with online services is becoming ex-
tremely common for the users. However, in these interactions, users provide
personal and private information for some ecommerce services, especially
via keyboard. For example, while online banking is a very convenient way
to access bank services, fraudster that gained personal data has an easy
access to the bank account of the cheated person. Besides, the increasing
popularity of Online Social Networking (OSN), such as Facebook, Twitter
and LinkedIn, has been accompanied with an increasing interest in the risk
to be attacked and manipulated. Since OSN services are open to all the
Internet users, they are particularly subjected to Sybil attacks [82], during
which a malicious user creates one or multiple fake OSN profiles. These
kinds of frauds are known also as Fake Profile Attacks (FPA) [83]. In FPA,
real personal information is used to create a fake profile that takes the iden-
tity of an unsuspecting user. There is a large number of reasons why people
create fake accounts on OSN. We can classify them into two categories: so-
cial reasons and business motivations. Social reasons include, for instance,
friendly pranks, online gaming, stalking, cyberbullying, and concealing real
identity to bypass some real-life constraints [84]. These cheating may cause
a lot of problems in our daily life, such as in stalking cases and other pri-
vacy issues, but they have less impact on the online community in terms
of cybersecurity. On the other hand, business motivations lead to use fake
accounts for more malicious behaviors in the online security context. In all
these scenarios, the truthfulness of the information provided by remote users
becomes a key issue, mostly concerning the user authentication procedures.
It has been reported that, on February 2010, 1.5 million Facebook accounts
were on sale on the black market [83, 85]. This is the reason why Facebook
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is called with the pseudonym of Fakebook. Fake accounts are bought or cre-
ated to increase the visibility of niche content, forum posts, and fan pages by
manipulating votes or visit counts [86]. Spammers abuse of OSN messaging
systems to post junk emails or advertisement, inducing customers to pay
for clicks. Furthermore, fake accounts can be used to access personal user
information and perform large-scale crawls over social graphs. During the
registration on a OSN, if the system is able to detect when a user provides
false personal information, the creation of fake profiles will become harder,
significantly reducing the feasibility of Fake Profile Attacks (FPA). Given
these issues and the vast amount of personal sensitive data shared on on-
line services (e.g., living location, Pin-Code), scientific literature proposed
different measures to prevent accounts being attacked and cloned [87], but
the problem has not yet been solved effectively.
The aim of this chapter is to propose and evaluate a new tool able to
detect deceptive users through the interaction between users and keyboard.
More precisely, we want to clarify that using keystroke analysis makes it
possible to detect people providing false personal information during the
authentication on an online service.
Chapter Organization. The remainder of the chapter is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 4.1, we review current state-of-the-art related to keystroke
dynamics. Then in the following Section 4.2, we give a detail illustration of
our tool. We report our results in Section 4.4. Finally, we make a discussion
and summary of this chapter in Section 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.
4.1 Related Work
In this section, we first report some background concepts on the functioning
of human cognitive system during the processing of a deceptive informa-
tion. Then, we survey the work on keystroke dynamics as a way to detect
deception.
4.1.1 Cognitive Basis of Deception
Cognition is largely involved in the process of lie [88]. One of the main
evidences relates to the increase in cognitive load associated with falsehood
productions [89]. Generally, a greater cognitive load produces a bad per-
formance in the task the subject is carrying out, in terms of timing and
errors [90]. In particular, subjects manifest a lengthening of reaction times
(RTs) and an increase in errors rate. Since lying is more cognitive demand-
ing than telling the truth, our cognitive system becomes slower when we
have to produce a lie [91]. According to the literature, this is probably due
to the fact that in a falsehood condition we don’t simply have to produce
an answer, but we have to inhibit the ”true” answer and, subsequently,
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produce a ”false” answer [92]. The generation of a lie requires to moni-
tor the reaction of the interlocutor and to adjust the behavior congruently
to the lie [93]. This phenomenon can be observed by studying the RTs in
a double choice task: the choice between two alternatives becomes slower
in the deceptive responses than the truthful responses [94]. According to
the functioning of our cognitive system, behavioral-based lie detection tools
have been proposed to identify liars, such as the RT-based Concealed Infor-
mation Test (RT-CIT) [95] and the autobiographical Implicit Association
Test (aIAT) [96]. CIT and aIAT have been shown to have a lie detection
accuracy around 90% and are generally applied in legal context, for exam-
ple to determine which one between two alternative versions of a crime is
true. More recently, Monaro and colleagues developed a novel technique [97]
that is able to identify liars about identity based on the mouse dynamics
analysis with an accuracy around 95% [98, 99, 100]. The technique requires
the suspect to undergo a computerized test in which unexpected questions
about the claimed identity are presented on a computer screen. The sub-
ject is required to respond using the mouse: the trajectory is recorded in
its spatial-temporal characteristics, and then classified by machine learning
methods as coming from a truthful or deceptive responder. This is the first
technique in literature that exploits human-computer interaction to spot
faked autobiographical information, as identity. Indeed, it is the first lie
detection tool that allows to establish if an information is true or false, un-
like CIT and aIAT that need that two alternatives are given to identify the
true and the false one. Since RTs and mouse dynamics are considered reli-
able behavioral indices of deception, keystroke characteristics may provide
a clue for recognizing deceits. The authors in [14], t proposed a Keystroke
Dynamics Deception Detection model to explain the relationship between
deceptive behavior and keystroke dynamics. According to this model, the
production of a falsehood may cause an increase in both emotional arousal
and cognitive load. These may result in a consequent change in the fine
motor control, which in turn results in a deviation of the typing ability,
affecting the keystroke dynamics personal baseline.
4.1.2 Deception Detection via Keystroke Dynamics
Keystroke dynamics is the detailed timing information about human typing
rhythm: it describes exactly when each key is pressed and released, while a
person is typing at a computer keyboard, a mobile phone or a touch screen
panel [101]. The typing pattern analysis could be considered as an implicit
behavior measure, because users are not aware of it during the interaction
with the device [102]. Furthermore, keystroke dynamics is unique and char-
acteristic for each individual [103]. For this reason, keystroke dynamics has
been used for security purposes, such as user authentication [104] and user
identification [105], to differentiate between two or more different users. Re-
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searchers have also demonstrated that it is possible to investigate changes
in typing behavior within subjects, for example in emotion discrimination
[106] or in the distinction between stress and non-stress conditions [107].
According to literature, some studies focused on extracting deception
from typed text, but the majority of these used a linguistic approach or
considered only some simple features of the text rather than the rhythm of
typing [108, 109]. Mihalcea et al. in [108] collected deceptive and truth-
ful personal statements about given topics from Amazon Mechanical Turk
participants. Using a classifier based on psycholinguistic analysis, they ob-
tained an accuracy of 70% in classifying true and deceptive statements.
Ott et al. [109] also used Mechanical Turk to generate a dataset of 400
deceptive hotel reviews. These were combined with 400 truthful reviews
from TripAdvisor about the same hotels. True and false reviews were used
to train a machine learning classifier based on three different approaches
(genre identification, psycholinguistic analysis and text categorization) that
could distinguish deceptive from truthful reviews at the 90% accuracy level.
Zhou et al. in [110, 111] investigated if behavioral indicators can be used for
deception detection in instant messaging. They explored different nonverbal
and verbal behaviors during a chat discussion between participants, show-
ing that these indices could significantly differentiate deceivers from truth
tellers, such as participation level, discussion initiation, cognitive complex-
ity and non-immediacy of sentences, frequency of spontaneous corrections,
lexical and content diversity. Derrick et al. submitted the participants to
a computer-mediated chat-based, instructing them to be deceitful or truth-
ful in response to questions, according to a prompt given by the system.
The Chatterbot captured four main indices: response time, number of edits
(basic keystrokes as backspace and delete), word count and lexical diver-
sity. The results support cognitive load theory, confirming that deception
is positively correlated with the response time and the number of edits, but
negatively correlated to word count.
Currently, only two works in literature considered the human typing
rhythm associated with the production of a deceit [14, 15]. Grimes et
al. tested the Keystroke Dynamics Deception Detection model with a pi-
lot study. Each subject shared three statements, two truthful and one
falsehood, on a web page. Keystroke characteristics were captured by a
JavaScript based web application. The authors did not discuss the results,
but they pointed out its limitations. Banerjee et al. analyzed different
keystroke parameters to improve the performance of a classifier in distin-
guishing between truthful and deceptive writers of online reviews and essays
collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each Turker wrote a truthful and
a deceptive text on three topics (restaurant review, gay marriage and gun
control). They captured both mouse and keyboard events (KeyUp, Key-
Down and MouseUp) and extracted the following features: editing patterns
(i.e., number of deletion keystrokes, number of MouseUp events, number of
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arrow keystrokes), writing speed and pauses (i.e., timespan of entire docu-
ment, average timespan of word plus preceding keystroke, average keystroke
timespan, average timespan of spaces, average timespan of non-white spaces
keystrokes, average interval between words) and writing speed variations
over word categories (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives, function words, content
words). They implemented a binary SVM classifier that achieved a base-
line average accuracy of 83.62%. Introducing keystroke features, authors
obtained a statistically significant improvement of the deception detection
classifier, ranging from 0.7% to 3.5%. We underline that none of the afore-
mentioned work takes into account keystroke dynamics as tool to detect
deceptive personal information.
4.2 Method
In this section, we present the experimental task performed by the users
and the characteristics of our sample. Then, we give information about the
implementation of the web site for the data collection. Finally, we describe
data collected and we make our hypotheses about the users’ behavior in the
experimental conditions.
4.2.1 Task
We led an experiment relieving keystroke dynamics of subjects when they
completed autobiographical fields. From a practical point of view, this task
is similar to what happens, for example, when people complete a registration
form on a social network website. This is the first reason why we decide to
ask people for autobiographical information. The second one is that autobi-
ographical information is reliable, verifiable and not depending on changes
in subject’s opinion or emotional state. The task follows the structure of the
previous experiment described in related work section. During the experi-
ment, participants were under to two conditions: in true condition, they had
to complete the required fields with their real autobiographical information;
while in false condition, they were instructed to complete the fields using
false autobiographical information. These two conditions were randomized
at each question. This means that subjects randomly wrote 50% of true and
50% of false autobiographical information. Subjects could distinguish the
required condition by the color of field (i.e., red = false, green = true). The
experiment contained 50 different autobiographical proposed to participates
in both conditions (i.e., each subject compiled a total of 100 fields). In what
follows, we list the 50 autobiographical fields presented to each subject:
• Identity : First name; Last name
• Physical characteristic: Gender; Weight; Height; Eye and Hair color;
Shoe size.
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• Birth: Age; Day, Month and Year of birth; Zodiac sign; Region,
Province and City of birth; Citizenship; Native language.
• Residence: Region, Province, City, Address of residence.
• Contacts: e-mail; Phone number; Telephone service provider.
• Education: Primary school city, Middle school city, High school name,
city and graduation mark, University location, department and faculty
attended.
• Interests: Mobile phone brand and color; Car brand and color; Prac-
ticed sports; Instruments played; Animals owned; Cities where you
spent a holidays and a New Year’s Eve.
• Relatives and friends: Mother’s first and last name; Father’s first
name; Name of a grandparent, a family member, the last partner,
a close friend.
Fields were shown to participants in a random order, to avoided that the
user could guess the next question. As an example, on-line registration forms
usually asks user’s surname right after his name, so the user could infer the
information he has to insert next.
Before starting the real experiment, participants were required to com-
plete a warm-up block (consisting of six not autobiographical fields) to make
the subject takes confidence with the task. The purpose of this block was to
make sure that the subject understands the task and takes confidence with
the tool. The warm-up block did not contain autobiographical information,
but sentences related to the actual subject’s situation or his/her preferences.
Data collected from this block was not taken into account for the statistical
analysis. The total duration of the task was about 15-20 minutes.
Figure 4.1: User Interface.
In order to implement the task, we designed a website using PHP, HTML,
MySql and JavaScript. In particular, the recording of keystrokes and timing
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was implemented using JavaScript. Figure 4.1 illustrates the final website
user interface. Participant has to insert the answer in the provided rect-
angular field. The green color of the autobiographical field indicates that
a true answer is required, while the red color of the autobiographical field
indicates that a false answer is required. The collected data were stored in
MySql Ver 14.14 database.
4.2.2 Participants
Participants were recruited via Internet (mailing lists and Facebook invita-
tion). In the experiment, they completed the task autonomously by con-
necting to our website. All subjects used their own PC to avoid the non-
confidence with a specific keyboard, operative system and graphic interface
that could possibly affect the ability to typing normally. Of 244 subjects
recruited, 204 subjects completed the experiment, 31 had quit it before the
end and 9 had stop after registration form. Subjects with visual diseases
that could affect the test performance were excluded (e.g., dyschromatopsia,
aniridia). Not Italian mother tongue subjects that complete the experiment
with a non-Italian keyboard were ruled out. According to a first observa-
tional data analysis, we leave out participants that showed a clear intention
to compromise the test (e.g., Name answer ”Goofy”). The final sample
counted 190 participants, 145 females and 45 males (age mean = 39.65, SD
= 12.76, years of education mean = 16.45, SD = 1.8). Before the registra-
tion at our web site, all subjects agreed with the informed consent. Finally,
they compiled a brief form containing demographic information, such as age,
education, job, mother tongue and visual disease, before receiving task in-
structions. Since each subject completed 50 true and 50 false sentences, we
collected 19, 000 total observation, respectively 9, 500 true and 9, 500 false.
4.2.3 Collected Measures
Because previous studies on user authentication deemed that a timing res-
olution from 0.1s to 1µs is sufficient to capture typing characteristics, data
were time stamped and measured up to microseconds (µs) precision. During
each experimental session, we collected the following data:
• Prompt-first digit index: interval between the onset of the stimulus
and the first key pressed.
• Prompt-enter index: total time between onset of the stimulus and the
enter key pressed.
• Down time: timestamp for each key pressed.
• Up time: timestamp for each key released.
39
Q. Li Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects
• Character frequency: assigning an identification code to any key, the
frequency of pressing a specific character was recorded.
From raw data, the following measures have been calculated:
• Writing time: speed of typing, that correspond to prompt-enter index
divided by the number of characters typed.
• Up and down time: sum of down and up time for each key pressed.
• Press time: time duration between a key down and a key up.
• Flight time: interleaving time between a key up and a key down.
• Tri-graphs: sum of up time, down time or up and down time for three
consecutive keys.
• Special characters frequency: number of key pressing for Shift, Del
and Canc, Space and Arrows characters.
• Answer length: number of final character of the answer.
4.2.4 Hypothesis
Based on literature evidence, we expected that people show a different
keystroke dynamics pattern when they mislead and when they write true
information. In particular, we expected that: (i) Subjects take a longer
time to start writing personal information when they are declaring the false;
(ii) a greater total time is required to write a false information than a true
information; (iii) subjects use a larger number of correction keys (e.g., delete,
canc) when they have to produce fake information; (iv) greater number of
characters is used in responding the truth; (v) participants show a different
keystroke pattern when they are writing the false and when they are giving
true information. Specially, we assume that in lying condition there is a
lengthening in press time and flight time.
4.3 Data Analysis and Models
In this section, we discuss the mathematical tool and models we used to
analyze data obtained from users. After collecting data, the data analysis
procedures features extraction, answers selection, features selection, data
filtering, data normalization, and classification are detailed explained in the
following sections.
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4.3.1 Features Extraction
From the raw data collected during the task, we have extracted features in
order to build a dataset that can be used for classification. Data related
to keystrokes was extracted from the actual user input with her keyboard.
Differently from other kind of features, the raw data of keystrokes are nu-
meric series with different lengths according to the number of key pressed.
In order to use this data into a classifier, we needed to process this data
with variable to obtain a vector of features with fixed number of elements.
For this reason, we extracted from each keystrokes data (up time, down
time, press time and flight time, and tri-graphs) several statistical features:
minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation, median absolute
deviation, variance, kurtosis, and skewness.
4.3.2 Answers Selection
In order to build the classification model, an answer selection was run. First,
responses that contained too few characters to capture typing pattern have
been removed (Age, Day of birth, Weight, Height, Shoe size). Second, the
autobiographical fields for which the majority of the subjects gave an incon-
sistent response have been cut out (Name of your high school, High school
graduation, Name of your university department). A final number of 42
autobiographical fields were considered for statistical analysis. Finally, to
investigate if some answers are better than others in revealing differences
in the keystroke pattern between truth and lies, a point biserial correlation
analysis was run, considering 10 main features as dependent variables.
4.3.3 Features Selection
Features considered are the following: (1) prompt-first digit index, (2) writ-
ing time, (3) mean of up and down time, (4) mean of up time, (5) mean of
down time, (6) mean of flight time, (7) mean of press time, (8) tri-graph
mean of up and down time, (9) tri-graph mean of up time, (10) tri-graph
mean of down time. Table 4.1 reports the rpb coefficient for autobiograph-
ical fields that showed a higher correlation value between the true/false
condition and the dependent variables (rpb > 0.5 = large effect size, rpb
> 0.3 = medium effect size, and rpb < 0.1 = small effect size). Since our
feature space consists of more than three hundred features, the classification
could be affected by a phenomenon known as curse of dimensionality [112].
In order to avoid this phenomenon, we performed a feature selection using
an ANOVA F-value between labels and features for classification tasks. In
practice, this features selection gives score to each feature according to its
correlation with the label. Thus, we select one hundred features with the
best correlation score.
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Table 4.1: Rpb coefficient for autobiographical fields.
Features
First
name
Last
name
Year
birth e-mail
Phone
number
(1) 0.57 0.61 0.32 0.66 0.07
(2) 0.26 0.29 0.43 0.65 0.23
(3) 0.34 0.23 0.47 0.62 0.31
(4) 0.34 0.23 0.48 0.61 0.32
(5) 0.34 0.24 0.48 0.62 0.31
(6) 0.28 0.20 0.47 0.59 0.34
(7) -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.02
(8) 0.34 0.25 0.47 0.53 0.29
(9) 0.33 0.24 0.46 0.61 0.34
(10) 0.33 0.25 0.46 0.61 0.33
4.3.4 Data Filtering
As we described in Section 4.2, the data collection has been performed in an
unsupervised environment, in order to simulate a real world scenario. Un-
fortunately, such method is prone to human errors or distractions. For this
reason, we filtered out every sample with anomalous durations of features
prompt-first digit and prompt-enter. In particular, we discarded the sample
with the values for those features above the 90% according to the dataset
(i.e., around 5 and 20 seconds for prompt-first digit and prompt-enter, re-
spectively). Reasonably, if we can measure durations greater than those
bounds, it means that the participant is distracted, thus her performance
for that answer should not be considered valid.
4.3.5 Data Normalization
Since the behavior of a user while she is answering to questions changes
from subject to subject, we had to consider to normalize the data collected
from a user. To normalize data, we applied a transformation of each value
in z-point, based on the mean and the standard deviation of all the answers
of the specific user. With such normalization, it is possible to reduce the
difference between users with very different behaviors and compare them.
This normalization can be applied to a specific user only if we collected the
behavior of that specific participant under both conditions (i.e., true and
false). Moreover, such normalization can be done only on features regarding
times and keystrokes. The normalization was not applied to features such as
the frequency of use for special characters and answer length because they
are related to the answer content instead of users’ behavior. Finally, we
scaled from 0 to 1 the values applying a min-max scaler for each feature in
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the dataset. This scaling is useful to provide the classifier with a fixed range
of values for the features, thus to speed up the training and the validation.
4.3.6 Classification
Random forest classifier is an ensemble supervised machine learning algo-
rithm that acquires knowledge about a specific context through examples.
After the training phase, where such classifier makes up their knowledge
from past experience, it produces an inferred model able to classify un-
labeled examples. In an optimal test scenario, the algorithm determines
properly the class labels for unseen examples. The main principle behind
ensemble methods is that a group of weak learners can be combined together
to form a strong learner. In our case, Random forest leverages decision tree
classifiers as weak learners. In practice, this ensemble method combines
together the results of several decision trees trained with different portions
of the training dataset and different subsets of features. Interested readers
could find additional details in [113].
In our analysis, we used a model validation technique called cross-
validation to evaluate the performance of our classifier. The performance
can be generalized over different and independent training and test sets.
This technique tries to simulate the performance of the predictive model on
the real world scenarios and limit problems like over fitting. For each round,
cross-validation creates a partition of the dataset into two complementary
subsets given certain constraints by the operator, trains the model on one
subset (i.e., training set), and tests the model on the other subset (i.e., test-
ing set). The cross-validation provides more multiple rounds on different
partitions of the dataset, and the results are averaged over all the rounds.
4.4 Results
In this section,we report and discuss the results obtained both from statisti-
cal analysis and the classification model introduced in the previous section.
First, we discuss statistical results. Second, we describe the possible scenar-
ios of application of our deceit detection analysis. Then, for each scenario,
we focus on the settings of the mathematical models (i.e., normalization and
cross validation) that have to be used in that scenario.
4.4.1 Statistical Analysis
We analyzed the statistical differences in collected data between the two
task conditions (true condition and false condition). The analysis of the
mean speed difference between true and false condition for each subject,
reveals that participants are generally slower in lying than telling the truth.
This difference emerges in all of the 10 features considered but press time.
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Table 4.2 reports the percentage of participants that are averagely slower
in true condition than false condition and the results for the pair-samples
t-test analysis. In Mean time difference column, we report the participants
that are slower in the true condition than in the false one. Mean of the time
difference between true and false answers is also reported in percentage. In
last column are reported the value for pair-samples t-test, all effects are
reported as significant at p < .01. The prompt-first digit index is the best
feature that discriminates between the two conditions.
Analyzing answer length, we found that 90% participants type averagely
a larger number of characters answering in true condition than in the false
one. This difference is statistically significant (t = 16.76, p < 0.01). As
regards the number of special characters pressed, 70.5% of subjects use a
greater number of space breakers in true condition comparing to the false
one (t = 9.71, p < 0.01). Conversely, participants have a statistically lower
rate of use of Shift (t = −4.30, p < 0.01) and Del and Canc (t = −3.61,
p < 0.01) keys in true condition compared to false condition. No difference
between the two conditions emerges in the frequency of use for other special
characters.
Table 4.2: Statistical analysis results.
Features % of subjects
Mean time
difference (%) t-test
(1) 98.42% 24.83% t=-23.96, p < .01
(2) 73.16% 10.91% t=-7.03, p < .01
(3) 72.63% 9.07% t=-6.93, p < .01
(4) 73.68% 10.11% t=-7.58, p < .01
(5) 73.16% 10.19% t=-7.56, p < .01
(6) 73.68% 13.52% t=-7.09, p < .01
(7) 44.21% -0.82% t=0.87, p = .38
(8) 73.16% 8.34% t=-7.35, p < .01
(9) 74.74% 10.22% t=-7.76, p < .01
(10) 74.74% 10.31% t=-7.77, p < .01
4.4.2 Scenarios
We consider three main scenarios when it is required to understand if the
user is answering the truth to a question or if she is providing false infor-
mation. Each scenario is characterized by the information available to train
the classifier. In what follows, we list three scenarios:
• New answer : the participant answers to a single question and we want
to classify her answer. This means that we can use as training set both
the other user answers and the answers of other users in the dataset.
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In this scenario, it is possible to apply the normalization over the user’s
answers and perform a leave-one-out cross-validation.
• New question: all users answer to a question never asked before. In
this case, it is possible to train the classifier with a training set includ-
ing all the questions previously answered by subjects. Once again, it
is possible normalize the data in the training set according to the user
that is answering since we know her behavior from the previously an-
swered questions. In this scenario, we can apply a leave-one-question-
out cross-validation, where for each turn the data about a specific
question are excluded from the training set to become the test set.
• New user : in this scenario, we aim to evaluate if a new user is lying or
not during the whole task. This scenario is useful in order to under-
stand if the user’s behavior in both the test conditions is similar to the
ones of the other population in the dataset. The cross-validation used
to simulate this scenario consists in training a classifier with the data
from all the users of the population except for one, which becomes
part of the test set.
For each scenario, we can consider two cases: if we have the enrollment
phase of a registration or not. This because during the enrollment phase
the user answers on truthful and deceit conditions, thus we normalize the
data collected from the user. In the other case, we do not have any prior
information about the user behavior in both conditions. In fact, the new
user might answer only under a specific condition (e.g., she answers only the
truth), thus we cannot apply any normalization on data.
4.4.3 Classification Results
In this analysis, we considered a dataset of 1580 examples (i.e., answers) and
we evaluated the performance of the classification leveraging cross-validation
on different partition on the dataset according to the scenario mentioned
above. More in details, we performed a leave-one-out cross-validation for
new answer scenario, and a leave-one-label-out cross-validation for new ques-
tion and new user, where the label corresponds to question and user iden-
tifiers, respectively. For each scenario, we also evaluated the influence of
normalization application on user data. The results of our evaluation are
summarized in Figure 4.2, where the accuracy is expressed in terms of F-
measure for the former scenario (i.e., new answer) and averaged F-measure
for the latter two scenarios (i.e., new question and new user).
As we can notice, the results for the scenarios where normalization of
user data is applied outperform the ones where it is not applied. We recall
that normalization can be applied only if we are considering data collected
from a user under both conditions, thus we know the behavior of the user
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Figure 4.2: Accuracy for the three scenarios.
0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3-0.4 0.4-0.5 0.5-0.6 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1.0
F-Measure
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Us
er
s (
%
)
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of classification in new user scenario,
with normalization.
when she lies or if she tells the truth. In particular, we are able to achieve
an accuracy of 76% on the new answer scenario with normalization. We
can also observe a significant standard deviation on new user scenario. In
order to investigate further on this phenomenon, we report in Figure 4.3 the
frequency of F-measure obtained by cross-validation runs for single users.
We observe that for the majority of users we obtain an accuracy greater
than 60%. This means that our model is not able to classify correctly (i.e.,
the accuracy is under the 50%) only the 4% of the whole population.
We can also observe a significant standard deviation on new user sce-
nario, both with and without normalization. In order to investigate further
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Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of classification in new user scenario,
without normalization.
on this phenomenon, we report in figures 4.3 and 4.4 the frequency of F-
measure obtained by cross-validation runs for single users with and without
normalization, respectively. We observe that, in both graphs, for the major-
ity of users we obtain an accuracy greater than 60%. This means that our
model is not able to classify correctly (i.e., the accuracy is under the 50%)
only the 4% and 7.6% of the whole population, with and without applying
the normalization, respectively.
4.5 Discussion
From our analysis, we were able to make several interesting observations.
Subjects have slower writing pattern when they are in a position to provide
fake information. In particular, they manifest a lengthening in the total
writing speed that is due to more time take in down time, up time and
flight time. Furthermore, in the falsehood condition participants take a
longer time to start writing (prompt-first digit index). The origin of the
strong importance of this feature can be certainly explained by the cognitive
mechanisms involved in the processing of the lie, discussed in Section 4.1.
Another important observation concerns the answers that better show
the difference between a true and a false condition response. The autobi-
ographical information that has a higher correlation with the experimental
condition are frequently typed on the keyboard. Therefore, the shortest re-
sponse time in answering truthfully could be a result of a procedural memory
mechanism [114]. According to these results, we can hypothesize that the
characteristic keystroke pattern during the production of a deceit response
is due to two different processes: a cognitive mechanism that results in a
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longer time before start writing, and a procedural mechanism that makes
more automatic the typing of information that we use frequently.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a new method based on keystroke dynamics
to distinguish between fake and truthful personal information written via a
computer keyboard. We reached an overall accuracy of 76% in the classifica-
tion of a single answer as truthful or deceptive. Compared with the current
existing behavioral lie detection tools, as the CIT and the aIAT [95, 96], and
similar to mouse dynamics lie detection [98], keystroke dynamics offers the
advantage to be apply as covert lie detection, as required by real context (e.g.
in social account creation or in online banking authentication). Moreover,
the detection of false information via keystroke dynamics is more flexible
than mouse dynamics. Summarizing, our work shows that keystroke anal-
ysis could have a great potential in detecting the veracity of self-declared
personal information. We believe our work paves the way for further re-
search in this area, as well as for a significant number of useful practical
applications in all scenarios where users input information remotely via a
keyboard.
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HCI Impact on Network
Traffic
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Network Traffic on
Mobile Devices
The last decade has been marked by the rise of mobile devices which are
nowadays widely spread among people. The most diffused examples of such
mobile devices are the smartphone and the tablet. When compared with tra-
ditional cell phones, smartphones and tablets (we referred as mobile devices)
have an enormously increased computational power, more available memory,
a larger display, and the Internet connectivity via both Wi-Fi and cellular
networks. Moreover, such devices run mobile operating systems which are
able to experience multimedia contents, as well as to run mobile applica-
tions (also called apps). Combined together, these elements enable both
smartphones and tablets to have the same functionalities typically offered
by laptops and desktop computers.
According to the report in [115], smartphone users were 25.3% of the
global population in 2015, and this percentage is expected to grow till 37%
in 2020. Similarly, the statistics about tablets reported in [116] indicate a
global penetration of 13.8% in 2015, expected to reach 19.2% in 2020. The
driving forces of this tremendous success are the ubiquitous Internet connec-
tivity, thanks to the worldwide deployment of cellular and Wi-Fi networks,
and a large number of apps available in the official (and unofficial) market-
places. A mobile device typically hosts a lot of sensitive information about
its owner, such as contacts, photos and videos, and GPS position. Such in-
formation has to be properly protected, especially when it is transmitted to
remote services. Since an important fraction of the overall Internet traffic is
due to mobile devices, it is not surprising that attackers and network traffic
analysts have soon started to target them.
Network traffic analysis (we referred as traffic analysis) is the branch
of computer science that studies inferential methods which take the net-
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work traces of a group of devices as input, and give information about those
devices, their users, their apps, or the traffic itself as output. Network
traces can be captured at different layers (e.g., data-link layer, application
layer), different points (e.g., within a Wi-Fi network, within the devices),
and their content is often encrypted (making analysis even more challeng-
ing). Typically, researchers follow two different approaches for analyzing
mobile network traffic: (i) taking pre-existent methods designed for tradi-
tional Internet traffic, and adapting them to the mobile scenario; or (ii)
developing new methods tailored to mobile Internet traffic properties. For
this reason, the research community investigates on network traffic analysis
techniques to improve both security and privacy on mobile devices.
Chapter Organization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 5.1, we present the classifications adopted to report the works.
In the following sections, we survey the works according to three criteria:
(i) the goal of the analysis; (ii) the capturing point; and (iii) the targeted
mobile platforms. Especially, in Section 5.2, we explain the goal of analysis
targeted on the human interaction with mobile devices. Finally, we conclude
this chapter in Section 5.3.
5.1 Categorization of Work
Overall, we survey 56 works, published between 2010 and 2017. Figure 5.1
shows that the number of publications in the considered research field has
significantly increased in the last years. We believe that this amount of work
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Figure 5.1: Number of published works sorted by year.
will grow in the future as the global spreading of mobile devices is increasing
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and their contribution to the worldwide Internet traffic is becoming more
significant.
In Table 5.1, 5.2, we report the surveyed works according to these crite-
ria. Moreover, for each work we indicate whether the proposed analyses are
still applicable in case of traffic encryption via either SSL/TLS or IPsec. It
is worth to notice that a few works (i.e., Wei et al. [117], and Tadrous and
Sabharwal [118]) propose multiple traffic analysis techniques, each affected
by traffic encryption in a different way.
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Table 5.1: All surveyed works.
Year Paper Goal of Analysis
Point of
Capturing Targeted Mobile Platform SSL/TLS IPsec
2010
Afanasyev et al. [119] Characterization, Usage APs, Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Falaki et al. [120] Characterization, Usage Devices
Android,
Windows Mobile 4 7
Husted et al. [121] Positioning Simulator Platform-independent 4 4
Maier et al. [122] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Shepard et al. [123] Characterization Devices iOS 4 7
2011
Finamore et al. [124] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Gember et al. [125] Characterization, Usage APs Platform-independent 7 7
Lee et al. [126]
App
Wired
Android, iOS 7 7
Characterization, Usage Platform-independent 7 7
Rao et al. [127] Characterization Wired Android, iOS 7 7
2012
Baghel et al. [128] Characterization Wired Android 4 7
Chen et al. [129] Characterization Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Ham et al. [130] Usage Devices Android 4 4
Musa et al. [131] Trajectory Monitors Platform-independent 4 4
Shabtai et al. [132] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Stevens et al. [133] PII Leakage APs Android 7 7
Su et al. [134] Malware Devices Android 4 7
Wei et al. [135] Malware Wired Android 7 7
Wei et al. [117] Characterization Devices Android 4 4/7
2013
Barbera et al. [136] Sociological Monitors Platform-independent 4 4
Kuzuno et al. [137] PII Leakage Devices Android 7 7
Qazi et al. [138] App APs, Devices Android 4 7
Rao et al. [139] App, PII Leakage Wired Android, iOS 4 7
Watkins et al. [140] User Actions APs Android 4 4
2014
Chen et al. [141]
OS APs Android, iOS 4 7
Tethering Monitors, Wired Platform-independent 4 7
Coull et al. [142] User Actions, OS Devices iOS 4 7
Crussell et al. [143] Ad Fraud Emulators Android 7 7
Lindorfer et al. [144] Characterization Emulators Android 7 7
Shabtai et al. [145] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Verde et al. [146] User Fingerprinting Wired Platform-independent 4 4
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Table 5.2: All surveyed works.
Year Paper Goal of Analysis Point of Capturing Targeted Mobile Platform SSL/TLS IPsec
2015
Chen et al. [147] Characterization Wired Android 7 7
Fukuda et al. [148] Characterization, Usage Devices Android, iOS 4 4
Le et al. [149] App, PII Leakage Devices Android 4 7
Park et al. [150] User Actions Wired Android 4 7
Soikkeli et al. [151] Usage Devices Platform-independent 4 4
Song et al. [152] PII Leakage Devices Android 4 7
Wang et al. [153] App Monitors iOS 4 4
Yao et al. [154] App APs, Emulators Android, iOS, Symbian 7 7
Zaman et al. [155] Malware Devices Android 7 7
2016
Alan et al. [156] App APs Android 4 4
Conti et al. [45] User Actions Wired Android 4 7
Mongkolluksamee
et al. [157] App Devices Android 4 7
Narudin et al. [158] Malware
Devices,
Emulators Android 7 7
Nayam et al. [159] Characterization Wired Android, iOS 7 7
Ren et al. [160] PII Leakage Wired
Android, iOS,
Windows Phone 4 7
Ruffing et al. [161] OS Monitors
Android, iOS,
Windows Phone, Symbian 4 4
Saltaformaggio
et al. [162] User Actions APs Android, iOS 4 4
Spreitzer et al. [163] Website Fingerprinting Devices Android 4 4
Tadrous et al. [118] Characterization APs Android, iOS 4 4/7
Vanrykel et al. [164]
PII Leakage,
User Fingerprinting Wired Android 7 7
Wang et al. [165] Malware Wired Android 4 7
2017
Arora et al. [166] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Continella et al. [167] PII Leakage Wired Android 4 7
Espada et al. [168] Characterization Devices Android 4 7
Malik et al. [169] OS APs
Android, iOS,
Windows Phone 4 4
Taylor et al. [170] App Wired Android 4 7
Wei et al. [171] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
55
Q. Li Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects
5.1.1 Classification by Goal of the Analysis
The first classification takes into account the goal of the analysis performed
on the captured mobile traffic. For each surveyed work, Table 5.1 and 5.2
provides this information in the Goal of the Analysis column.
Overall, we are able to identify fourteen goals. In Figure 5.2, we de-
pict such goals by their field of pertinence: apps, mobile users, and mobile
devices. In what follows, we list and briefly describe each of the goals:
Apps
Devices
Users
User action 
detection
Website 
fingerprinting
User 
fingerprinting
Usage study
Trajectory 
estimation
Tethering 
detection
Traffic 
characterization
Sociological 
inferenceDevice 
positioning
Operating 
system 
identification
Malware 
detection
PII leakage 
detection
App 
detection
Ad fraud 
detection
Figure 5.2: The goals of traffic analysis targeting mobile devices, and their
pertinence to apps, mobile users, and mobile devices.
1. Ad fraud detection (Ad Fraud in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to detect ad
fraud by a mobile app, i.e., to recognize if a mobile app is trying to
trick the advertising business model (e.g., fabricating false user clicks
on ads). This type of analysis is fundamental for ad providers, which
can protect themselves from dishonest app developers trying to illicitly
earn money.
2. App identification (App in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to recognize the net-
work traffic belonging to a specific mobile app. This type of analysis
can help network administrators in resource planning and manage-
ment, as well as in app-specific policy enforcement (e.g., forbidding a
social network app within an enterprise network). Moreover, app iden-
tification can be employed to uncover the presence of sensitive apps
(e.g., dating, health, religion) in the mobile device of a target user.
3. Device positioning (Positioning in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to discover
the geographical position of a mobile device. This type of analysis
helps infer social status, interests, and habits of the owner of a mo-
bile device. As a further step, the profiles of several mobile users
can be aggregated for marketing, as well as sociological studies. See
Section 5.2.1.
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4. Malware detection (Malware in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to detect
whether a mobile app behaves maliciously (e.g., downloading and in-
stalling malicious code from the network). This type of analysis can
be used to assess the security of an app submitted by a developer to
a mobile marketplace. In such case, the result of the security tests
decides whether the app can be released to the public. Moreover, mal-
ware detection algorithms can be embedded into anti-virus apps that
mobile users can use to check whether an installed app is malicious.
5. Operating system identification (OS in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to dis-
cover the operating system of a mobile device. This type of analysis is
usually a preliminary phase for more advanced attacks against mobile
devices: the adversary tries to infer the operating system of the target
mobile device in order to subsequently exploit an ad-hoc vulnerability
for that specific OS. Moreover, operating system identification car-
ried out on a large mobile user population can be a starting point for
other types of analysis not directly related to computer science (e.g.,
sociological studies).
6. PII leakage detection (PII Leakage in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to detect
and/or prevent the leakage of a mobile user’s Personal Identifiable In-
formation (PII). This type of analysis can be employed to assess the
behavior of a mobile app from a privacy point of view, by checking
which PII it actually discloses to remote hosts. Detecting PII leakage
is also the first step to prevent such problem, since it is then possi-
ble to block network transmissions carrying PII, or replace sensitive
information with bogus data. See Section 5.2.2.
7. Sociological inference (Sociological in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to infer
some kind of sociological information about mobile users (e.g., lan-
guage, religion, health condition, sexual preference, wealth), from one
or more properties related to their mobile devices (e.g., list of installed
apps, associated Wi-Fi networks). See Section 5.2.3.
8. Tethering detection (Tethering in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to detect if
a mobile device is tethering, i.e., it is sharing its Internet connectivity
with other devices, for which it acts as an access point. Tethering
constitutes a problem for cellular network providers, since it signifi-
cantly increases the volume of network traffic generated by a single
client. Such providers are therefore interested in tethering detection
techniques that can be used to prevent their customers from sharing
their Internet connectivity, or simply require them to pay an extra fee
to do that.
9. Traffic characterization (Characterization in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to
infer the network properties of mobile traffic. The knowledge of such
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properties is crucial to effectively deploy and configure the resources in
cellular networks, as well as in Wi-Fi networks serving mobile devices.
See Section 5.2.4.
10. Trajectory estimation (Trajectory in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to esti-
mate the trajectory (i.e., the movements) of a mobile device within a
geographical area. This type of analysis can help study the interests
and social habits of a mobile user. Moreover, trajectory estimation
can aid road traffic prediction along urban streets, by leveraging the
most frequent trajectories followed by the citizens that move along the
city. See Section 5.2.5.
11. Usage study (Usage in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to infer the usage habits
of mobile users (e.g., which are the most frequently used apps). As an
example, the knowledge of the places where mobile devices are mostly
used can drive the deployment of cellular stations and Wi-Fi hotspots.
See Section 5.2.6.
12. User action identification (User Actions in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to
identify a specific action that a mobile user performed on her mobile
device (e.g., uploading a photo on Instagram), or to infer some infor-
mation about that specific action (e.g., the length of a mobile user’s
message sent through an instant messaging app). Researchers can em-
ploy such analysis to discover the identity behind an anonymous social
network profile. This can be accomplished by verifying if there is a
match between the events reported on that profile’s page, and the ac-
tions a suspect performed while using the mobile app of that social
network. Alternatively, it is possible to build behavioral profiles of
mobile users, which are useful for user reconnaissance within networks
and, in aggregated form, for marketing studies. See Section 5.2.7.
13. User fingerprinting (User Fingerprinting in Table 5.1 and 5.2): to
detect the traffic belonging to a specific mobile user. This type of
analysis can be employed to trace a mobile user, by approximating her
position with the location of the Wi-Fi hotspot or cellular station to
which her mobile device is connected. From this information, it is then
possible to build a behavioral profile of that mobile user. Alternatively,
it is possible to examine a mobile traffic dataset in order to extract
and group together the network traces generated by a specific mobile
user. Such data can be subsequently used for other types of traffic
analysis targeting that user. See Section 5.2.8.
14. Website fingerprinting (Website Fingerprinting in Table 5.1 and
5.2): to infer which websites and/or webpages are visited by a mo-
bile user while navigating via the web browser of her mobile device.
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Similarly to sociological inference, this type of analysis can reveal in-
terests, social habits, religious belief, as well as sexual and political
orientations of a mobile user. See Section 5.2.9.
5.1.2 Classification by Point of Capturing
The second classification considers where and how the mobile traffic is cap-
tured. For each surveyed work, Table 5.1 and 5.2 provides this information
in the Point of Capturing column. It is worth to notice that: (i) we are
focusing on the (hardware and/or software) equipment that captures the
traffic; and (ii) we report the point of capturing only for those datasets for
which the authors give enough details about the collection process. Overall,
we identify six different points of capturing:
• Within one or more mobile devices, i.e., client-side (Devices in Table
5.1 and 5.2). This type of point of capturing is particularly useful if we
want to target a specific mobile app (e.g., Facebook), or a particular
network interface (e.g., cellular). We specify that this category also
includes the case of a network traffic logger installed within either:
(i) a mobile device emulator; and (ii) a machine to which the mobile
traffic is mirrored using a remote virtual network interface.
• At one or more wired network equipments (Wired in Table 5.1 and
5.2). The size of the population of monitored mobile devices varies
according to the type of considered network equipments: thousands
of mobile users in the case of edge routers (i.e., routers connecting
customers to the ISP’s backbone) and Internet gateways; from tens
to a few hundreds in the case of VPN servers and forwarding servers
(i.e., traditional desktop computer put in the middle of a wired link
and set up to log all traffic traversing it).
• At one or more access points of a Wi-Fi network (APs in Table 5.1
and 5.2). This type of point of capturing allows the number of mon-
itored mobile devices to vary from tens to a few thousands, and it is
suitable to capture the traffic of mobile devices while their users are
performing network-intensive tasks (e.g., watching streaming videos,
updating apps).
• At one or more Wi-Fi monitors (Monitors in Table 5.1 and 5.2). Re-
searchers usually employ this type of capturing devices to focus the
network traffic collection process on a specific geographical area of in-
terest (e.g., a train station). Such approach is often the only viable
solution whether it is not possible to directly access a target mobile
device, or the network to which it is connected.
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• At one or more machines running virtual mobile devices, i.e., emula-
tors (Emulators in Table 5.1 and 5.2). The possibility to run multiple
virtual mobile devices in parallel and control them via automated tools
enables a large-scale network traffic collection that would be more ex-
pensive if conducted on real mobile devices. It is important to highlight
that the traffic logging is performed by the host machines or their vir-
tualization managers. We do not consider the case in which the traffic
logging takes place within the emulated mobile devices (such case is
covered by the Devices category).
• At one or more virtual capturing points within a simulated environ-
ment generated and managed by a software program (Simulator in
Table 5.1 and 5.2). This point of capturing can help study particular
deployments of mobile devices that are not observable in a real-world
scenario because of technical, economical, or legal constraints.
5.1.3 Classification by Targeted Mobile Platform
The third classification considers the mobile platforms that are targeted by
the traffic analysis. For each surveyed work, Table 5.1 and 5.2 provides this
information in the Targeted Mobile Platform column. It is worth to specify
that we classify a work as platform-independent if its authors do not provide
information about the targeted mobile platforms, or such information is not
relevant to the analysis they perform on the mobile traffic.
Overall, we find four distinct mobile platforms: Android, Google’s open-
source mobile operating system; iOS, the operating system of Apple’s mobile
devices; Symbian, the first released modern mobile operating system; and
Windows Mobile/Phone, the mobile counterpart of Microsoft’s desktop op-
erating system.
5.2 Goals of Traffic Analysis Targeting Mobile De-
vices
In this section, we survey the works according to the goal of the analysis that
is performed on the mobile traffic. Table 5.3 and 5.4 summarizes the goals
of the surveyed works. As shown in Figure 5.3, the most frequently pursued
goal is traffic characterization (eighteen works), followed by usage study (ten
works), app identification (nine works), malware detection and PII leakage
detection (eight works each), user action identification (five works), operat-
ing system identification (four works), and user fingerprinting (two works).
Each of the following goals counts one work only: ad fraud detection, device
positioning, sociological inference, tethering detection, trajectory estima-
tion, and website fingerprinting. As shown in Table 5.3 and 5.4, twelve
works pursue two goals, and one work even three. In the following sections,
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we present the goal(s) related to Human-Computer Interaction and achieved
results for the surveyed work. We also discuss whether the proposed analysis
works on encrypted network traffic (e.g., IPsec, SSL/TLS).
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Table 5.3: The surveyed works listed by goal of the analysis.
Year Paper
Device
Positioning
PII
Leakage
Detection
Socio-
logical
Inference
Traffic
Characteri-
zation
Trajectory
Estimation
Usage
Study
User
Action
Identi-
fication
User
Finger-
printing
Website
Finger-
printing
2010
Afanasyev et al. [119] 4 4
Falaki et al. [120] 4 4
Husted et al. [121] 4
Maier et al. [122] 4 4
Shepard et al. [123] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [124] 4 4
Gember et al. [125] 4 4
Lee et al. [126] 4 4
Rao et al. [127] 4
2012
Baghel et al. [128] 4
Chen et al. [129] 4
Ham et al. [130] 4
Musa et al. [131] 4
Shabtai et al. [132]
Stevens et al. [133] 4
Su et al. [134]
Wei et al. [135]
Wei et al. [117] 4
2013
Barbera et al. [136] 4
Kuzuno et al. [137] 4
Qazi et al. [138]
Rao et al. [139] 4
Watkins et al. [140] 4
2014
Chen et al. [141]
Coull et al. [142] 4
Crussell et al. [143]
Lindorfer et al. [144] 4
Shabtai et al. [145]
Verde et al. [146] 4
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Table 5.4: The surveyed works listed by goal of the analysis.
Year Paper
Device
Positioning
PII
Leakage
Detection
Socio-
logical
Inference
Traffic
Characteri-
zation
Trajectory
Estimation
Usage
Study
User
Action
Identi-
fication
User
Finger-
printing
Website
Finger-
printing
2015
Chen et al. [147] 4
Fukuda et al. [148] 4 4
Le et al. [149] 4
Park et al. [150] 4
Soikkeli et al. [151] 4
Song et al. [152] 4
Wang et al. [153]
Yao et al. [154]
Zaman et al. [155]
2016
Alan et al. [156]
Conti et al. [45] 4
Mongkolluksamee
et al. [157]
Narudin et al. [158]
Nayam et al. [159] 4
Ren et al. [160] 4
Ruffing et al. [161]
Saltaformaggio
et al. [162] 4
Spreitzer et al. [163] 4
Tadrous et al. [118] 4
Vanrykel et al. [164] 4 4
Wang et al. [165]
2017
Arora et al. [166]
Continella et al. [167] 4
Espada et al. [168] 4
Malik et al. [169]
Taylor et al. [170]
Wei et al. [171] 4 4
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Figure 5.3: Number of published works sorted by goal of the analysis.
5.2.1 Device Positioning
The set of places frequently visited by a person tells a lot about her social
status, interests, and habits. Such information can be exploited for commer-
cial purposes (e.g., targeted advertisement), as well as intelligence activities
(e.g., police investigations). Since most of the people own a mobile device
and keep it with them all day long, locating the smartphone/tablet of a
target user becomes a simple yet effective way to know her position. More-
over, it is possible to build a profile of the subject by aggregating multiple
position detections.
We define as device positioning the inference of the geographical position
of a mobile device by analyzing the network traffic it generates. In this
section, we survey the works that propose this type of traffic analysis. We
point out that we do not consider the works in which: (i) the mobile traffic
is analyzed to detect the leakage of GPS coordinates (we consider this kind
of works in Section 5.2.2); (ii) the movements (not the position) of a mobile
device are reconstructed from its network traffic (we review this kind of
works in Section 5.2.5); and (iii) the analysis performed on the network
traffic is device-agnostic, i.e., it does not take into account the fact that the
target devices are smartphones/tablets (this kind of works is excluded since
it is too generic).
Husted and Myers in [121] investigate whether a malnet (i.e., a colluding
network of malicious Wi-Fi devices) can successfully determine the location
of a mobile device. Each malicious node looks for probe requests carry-
ing the MAC address of the target mobile device, and uploads its findings
to a central server where the data coming from all nodes is used for tri-
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lateration. Through a software simulation of a metropolitan population of
users equipped with 802.11g mobile devices, the authors show that 10% of
tracking population is sufficient to track the position of the remaining users.
Besides, the tracking benefits from extending the broadcasting range of the
mobile devices. This suggests that the adoption of newer 802.11 standards
can make it feasible to build a geolocating malnet.
5.2.2 PII Leakage Detection
A mobile device is a source of sensitive information about its owner (e.g.,
phone number, contacts, photos, videos, GPS position). In addition, apps
often require to access such information to deliver their services. As an
example, an instant messaging app (e.g., WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat)
requires to access the contacts saved in the device’s address book. As an-
other example, a social network app (e.g., Facebook, Instagram) requires to
inspect the device’s memory to find photos.
To disclose sensitive information to a remote host, an app must be au-
thorized to: (i) access some kind of sensitive information (e.g., the GPS
position); and (ii) connect to the Internet. The disclosure can be either
allowed or illicit, depending on the level of sensitivity of the disclosed in-
formation, the reason why the app transmits such information to a remote
host, and whether the user is aware of this transmission of sensitive data.
In this section, we focus on personal identifiable information (PII ), which
is information that can be used to identify, locate, or contact an individual.
In the domain of mobile devices, there are four types of PII:
• Information related to mobile devices, such as IMEI (International Mo-
bile Equipment Identity, a unique identifier associated to each mobile
device), Android Device ID (an identifier randomly generated on the
first boot of Android device), and MAC address (a unique identifier
assigned to each network interface).
• Information related to SIM cards, such as IMSI (International Mobile
Subscriber Identity, a unique identifier assigned to each subscriber of
a cellular service), and SIM Serial ID (the identifier assigned to each
SIM card).
• Information related to users, such as name, gender, date of birth,
address, phone number, and email.
• Information about user’s location, such as GPS position and ZIP code.
We define as PII leakage detection the analysis of the network traffic
of a mobile device in order to detect the leakage of user’s PII. Once a PII
leakage is detected, it is possible to apply suitable countermeasures, such
as blocking the network flows carrying the PII, or substituting the sensitive
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information with bogus data. The latter approach is a good solution for
mobile users who want to protect their privacy while being able to enjoy the
functionalities of the apps.
In Table 5.5, we present the surveyed works that deal with PII leakage
detection [133, 137, 139, 149, 152, 160, 164, 167]. For each work, we sum-
marize the targeted mobile platforms, and whether the PII leaks are simply
detected or also prevented.
Table 5.5: Works that deal with PII leakage detection.
Year Paper
Targeted Mobile Platform Action on PII Leaks
Android iOS Windows Phone Detection Prevention
2012 Stevens et al. [133] 4 4
2013
Kuzuno et al. [137] 4 4
Rao et al. [139] 4 4 4 4
2015
Le et al. [149] 4 4
Song et al. [152] 4 4 4
2016
Ren et al. [160] 4 4 4 4 4
Vanrykel et al. [164] 4 4
2017 Continella et al. [167] 4 4
Stevens at al. in [133] present a comprehensive study on thirteen popular
ad providers for Android. In particular, part of this study focuses on the
analysis of ad traffic in order to detect the transmission of the user’s PII.
The authors observe that at the time of writing only one of the considered ad
providers leverage encryption to protect its network traffic. For this reason,
they choose to perform a deep packet inspection to identify the leakage of the
user’s private information. The results show that several types of PII (e.g.,
age, gender, GPS position) are leaked in clear by ad libraries. Moreover,
the authors highlight that although none of the considered ad providers is
able to build a complete profile of the user, the presence of UDIDs in ad-
related traffic can be exploited by an external adversary to correlate sensitive
information from different ad providers and build a complete user profile.
Kuzuno and Tonami in [137] investigate the leakage of sensitive informa-
tion by the advertisement libraries embedded into free Android apps. They
focus on both original and hashed identifiers unique to mobile devices (i.e.,
IMEI and Android ID) and SIM cards (i.e., IMSI and SIM Serial ID), as well
as on the name of the cellular operator (CARRIER). The authors develop
two components: (i) a server application; and (ii) a mobile app that can be
installed on an Android device. The server application takes in input the
network traffic of a set of apps that leak sensitive information, and applies a
clustering method to generate traffic signatures. The mobile app leverages
such signatures to identify the sensitive information leaked by the other apps
installed on the device. To evaluate their solution, the authors employ the
network traffic of 1,188 free Android apps and achieve the following results:
94% of HTTP messages containing sensitive information are correctly de-
tected, with 5% false negatives (i.e., undetected HTTP messages carrying
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sensitive information), and less than 3% false positives (i.e., HTTP messages
without sensitive information, incorrectly identified as sensitive). Since the
signature generation phase requires to inspect HTTP messages looking for
sensitive information, the system cannot work on encrypted traffic.
Rao et al. in [139] and Ren et al. in [160] present ReCon, a cross-
platform system that allows mobile users to control the PII leaked in the
network traffic of their devices. ReCon is based on Meddle, therefore it
can inspect mobile traffic even if it is encrypted at transport layer, but
cannot cope with data transmissions protected by IPsec. Moreover, ReCon
offers a web interface through which the user can visualize in real time
which PII is leaked, and optionally modify such PII or block the connection
carrying it. In [139], the authors target two mobile OSes, namely Android
and iOS, and the PII leakage detection mechanism is based on a domain
blacklist. In [160], also Windows Phone is considered, and PII leaks are
detected using properly trained machine learning classifiers, among which
the best-performing (98.1% accuracy) is a C4.5 Decision Tree. The works in
[139, 160] expose an extensive leakage of sensitive information belonging to
all the types of PII we listed above, as well as the transmission of usernames
and passwords in both plain-text (HTTP) and encrypted (HTTPS) traffic.
Le et al. in [149] present AntMonitor, a system for collecting and ana-
lyzing network traffic from Android devices. Among other types of analysis,
AntMonitor can perform PII leakage detection. The authors capture the
network traffic of nine Android users for a period of five weeks, then inspect
the collected dataset searching the following PII: IMEI, Android Device ID,
phone number, email address, and device location. Overall, 44% and 66%
of the analyzed apps leak IMEI and Android Device ID, respectively, while
PII related to the user is rarely disclosed to remote hosts. It is worth to
notice that the proposed analysis requires to inspect application-layer data,
which is infeasible in case of traffic encryption, either at network (IPsec) or
transport layer (SSL/TLS).
Song and Hengartner in [152] develop PrivacyGuard, an open-source
Android app that leverages the VPNService class of the Android API for
eavesdropping the network traffic of the apps installed on the device. The
authors employ PrivacyGuard to investigate the leakage of PII related to mo-
bile users (e.g., phone number) and devices (e.g., IMEI) by Android apps. In
an evaluation conducted using 53 Android apps, PrivacyGuard detect more
PII leaks than TaintDroid [80]. The proposed app can optionally replace the
leaked information with bogus data. Moreover, it can inspect transmission
protected by SSL/TLS (through a man-in-the-middle approach), but cannot
deal with traffic encrypted via IPsec.
Vanrykel et al. in [164] investigate the leakage of sensitive identifiers in
the unencrypted network traffic of Android apps. The authors develop a
framework that automatically executes apps, collects their network traffic,
inspects the HTTP data, and detects the identifiers that are transmitted in
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clear. The analysis of 1260 Android apps (from 42 app categories) shows
that: (i) the Android ID and Google Advertising ID are the most frequently
leaked identifiers, while the SIM serial number, the IMSI, the device serial
number, and the email of the registered Google account are less common in
apps’ network traffic; (ii) there is an extensive leakage of app-specific iden-
tifiers; and (iii) certain apps leak the user’s phone number, email address,
or position.
Continella et al. in [167] develop Agrigento, an open-source framework
for the analysis of Android apps in order to detect PII leakage. Agrigento is
based on differential analysis, and its workflow consists of two phases. In the
first phase, the app under scrutiny is executed several times on a physical
device to collect: (i) its network traffic; and (ii) additional system- and
app-level information that is contextual to the execution (e.g., randomly-
generated identifiers, timestamps). Subsequently, the collected information
is aggregated to model the network behavior of the app. In the second
phase, a specific PII within the operating system of the mobile device is
set to a different value. The app is then executed once again to collect its
network traffic and the contextual information. Finally, a PII leakage is
reported if the collected data does not conform to the model learned before.
Evaluated on 1,004 Android apps, Agrigento detects more privacy leaks
than currently available state-of-the-art solutions (e.g., ReCon [160]), while
limiting the number of false positives. The proposed framework requires to
inspect HTTP messages and leverages a man-in-the-middle approach to deal
with HTTPS traffic. However, Agrigento does not work on network traffic
encrypted via IPsec.
5.2.3 Sociological Inference
A property of a mobile device (e.g., the list of installed apps, the Wi-Fi net-
works to which the device associated) characterizes its owner. Sociologists
can leverage this kind of information to study a population of mobile users.
In this section, we review the works that deal with sociological inference,
which we define as the analysis of the network traffic generated by mobile
devices in order to infer some kind of sociological information about their
users.
Barbera et al. in [136] investigate whether sociological information about
a large crowd can be inferred by inspecting the Wi-Fi probe requests gen-
erated by the mobile devices of those people. First of all, the authors: (i)
devise a methodology to convert a dataset of Wi-Fi probe requests into a
social graph representing the owners of the monitored mobile devices; and
(ii) develop an automatic procedure to infer the language of a given SSID.
Subsequently, they target gatherings of people at urban, national, and in-
ternational scale, as well as a mall, a train station, and a campus. In what
follows, we summarize the authors’ findings: (i) the social graph of all the
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targeted events has social-network properties; (ii) the distributions of lan-
guages and mobile device vendors match the nature of the monitored crowds;
and (iii) socially interconnected people tend to adopt mobile devices of the
same vendor, and appear in the same time slot.
5.2.4 Traffic Characterization
Network management can benefit from knowing the properties of the In-
ternet traffic that traverse the network. Such information can be used to
efficiently deploy the hardware equipments, as well as to setup them in order
to provide the best Quality of Service (QoS) to the users. This statement
particularly holds for networks serving mobile devices, since such devices
generate traffic with peculiar properties. In light of the rapid evolution of
mobile devices, the characterization of their Internet traffic is crucial to pro-
vide network administrators the information they need for resource planning,
deployment, and management.
We define as traffic characterization the analysis of the network traffic
generated by mobile devices in order to infer its properties. We group the
works that deal with traffic characterization into two sub-categories, accord-
ing to the scope of the analysis:
• The works that study the network traffic of specific apps and/or mo-
bile services. We survey nine works belonging to this category. Rao
et al. in [127] study the Android and iOS native apps of two video
streaming services, namely Netflix and YouTube. YouTube is targeted
also in [124]. The Android apps of Facebook and Skype are considered
in [128]. In [117], Wei et al. focus on 27 Android apps (19 free and
8 paid). In [144], the analysis covers over 1,000,000 unique Android
apps. In [147], Chen et al. analyze 5560 malicious Android apps (from
177 malware families). In [159], Nayam et al. study 63 Android and 35
iOS free apps, all belonging to the “Health & Fitness” category. The
work in [118] focuses on five interactive apps for both Android and iOS.
In [168], Espada et al. present a framework for traffic characterization
of Android apps, and choose Spotify as case study.
• The works that study the network traffic generated by a population of
mobile devices. We can further divide such works into two subsets:
– The works that compare mobile traffic with non-mobile one.
We survey four works belonging to this subcategory. The work
in [122] focuses on the network traffic of mobile devices when
they are connected to home Wi-Fi networks, while the works
in [119, 125, 126] carry out the same analysis for campus Wi-Fi
networks.
69
Q. Li Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects
– The works that only consider mobile traffic. We survey four works
belonging to this subcategory. The works in [129, 171] target cam-
pus Wi-Fi networks, while the works in [120, 123, 148] leverage
client-side measurements collected through logging apps.
Table 5.6: The surveyed works that deal with traffic characterization.
Year Paper Apps/Mobile Services
Mobile Devices
Non-mobile Only Mobile
2010
Afanasyev et al. [119] 4
Falaki et al. [120] 4
Maier et al. [122] 4
Shepard et al. [123] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [124] 4
Gember et al. [125] 4
Lee et al. [126] 4
Rao et al. [127] 4
2012
Baghel et al. [128] 4
Chen et al. [129] 4
Wei et al. [117] 4
2014 Lindorfer et al. [144] 4
2015
Chen et al. [147] 4
Fukuda et al. [148] 4
2016
Nayam et al. [159] 4
Tadrous et al. [118] 4
2017
Espada et al. [168] 4
Wei et al. [171] 4
In Table 5.6, we provide a view of the classification described above. In
what follows, we list the main properties of mobile traffic that stem from
the works we survey:
• Compared to residential broadband traffic, the daily volume of traffic
per mobile user is roughly one order of magnitude smaller [120].
• Mobile devices generate more downlink traffic than uplink one, show-
ing a clear client-server network behavior [120, 117, 148, 118].
• At the network layer, IP flows of mobile devices have shorter duration,
much higher number of packets, and much smaller packets, compared
to IP flows of non-mobile devices [126].
• Most of the transport-layer traffic is carried over TCP [120, 125, 129],
and more than half is encrypted [120]. Transfers within TCP con-
nections are small in size [120, 125], causing a high overhead for
lower-layer protocols, particularly when transport-layer encryption is
in place [120].
• Most of the application-layer traffic is carried over HTTP or HTTPS
[120, 125, 126, 129, 144, 147, 171]. Moreover, the analysis carried
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out by Chen et al. in [129] shows that: (i) the adoption of HTTPS
is increasing (a trend confirmed in [159, 171]); and (ii) Akamai and
Google servers serve nearly 40% of the mobile traffic.
• Mobile devices contact a less diverse set of hosts compared to non-
mobile devices [125, 129].
• Mobile devices experience a low loss rate on Wi-Fi networks [129]. On
cellular networks, instead, there are high delays and losses, as well as
low throughputs [120].
• An important fraction of the mobile traffic is due to video stream-
ing [122, 125], mainly on the YouTube platform [124].
• Android apps typically do not encrypt their network traffic (simply
relying on HTTP), connect to several different hosts, and a fraction of
their network traffic is related to Google’s services [117].
• A significant part of the network traffic generated by Android and iOS
free apps is due to advertisement and tracking services [159].
• The Android apps of Netflix and YouTube tend to periodically buffer
large portions of the video to be played, while their iOS counterparts
tend to initially buffer a large amount of data, then periodically buffer
small portion of the video to keep playback ongoing (although the
YouTube app employs large-block buffering under favorable network
conditions) [127]. Moreover, probably to deal with the TCP timeouts
caused by the delays of cellular networks, the Netflix and Youtube iOS
apps create a large number of TCP flows to provide a single video,
thus causing an overhead that is not necessary when mobile devices
are connected to Wi-Fi networks [127, 129].
5.2.5 Trajectory Estimation
In Section 5.2.1, we discussed the applications and privacy implications of
device positioning. In this section, we present a different problem: to infer
the trajectory followed by a mobile device in a geographical area, by ana-
lyzing the network traffic it generates. This type of traffic analysis, which
we call trajectory estimation, can help study the interests and social habits
of a mobile user (if we focus on a single individual), as well as aid traffic
prediction along urban streets (if we aggregate the trajectories of several
mobile users).
Musa and Eriksson in [131] present a system for passively tracking mobile
devices by leveraging the Wi-Fi probe requests they periodically transmit.
The idea is to employ a number of Wi-Fi monitors, which look for probe
requests from mobile devices and report each detection to a central server,
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where the detections of the same mobile device are turned into a spatio-
temporal trajectory. To evaluate their system, the authors set up three
deployments and leverage GPS ground truth to measure the accuracy of the
inferred trajectories. The mean error is under 70 meters when the distance
among the monitors is over 400 meters.
5.2.6 Usage Study
The habits of mobile users have significantly changed with the evolution of
cellphones toward smartphones and tablets. First of all, the adoption of
the touchscreen display has completely revolutionized the human-machine
interaction. Moreover, the development of mobile operating systems sup-
porting multitasking and third-party apps has enhanced the capabilities of
mobile devices well beyond the requirements for communication activities.
In this scenario, it is fundamental to understand how mobile users interact
with their mobile devices in order to improve the usability of mobile OSes
and apps, as well as to properly set up networks serving mobile devices. For
instance, the knowledge of places where mobile devices are mostly used can
drive the deployment of free Wi-Fi hotspots in order to reduce the traffic
load on cellular networks.
We define as usage study the analysis of the network traffic of mobile
devices in order to infer the usage habits of mobile users. The works we
review in this section leverage network-side measurements [119, 122, 124,
125, 126, 171], as well as data collected within mobile devices [120, 130, 148,
151]. Overall, we identify three perspectives to study the usage habits of
mobile users:
• The network. As an example, we can study when users are active (i.e.,
sending and receiving data) during the day, how long their periods of
activity are, how much traffic they generate, and which are the most
frequently used network interfaces (i.e., Wi-Fi or cellular).
• The apps and/or mobile services. As an example, we can study which
are the most frequently used apps/services, and which is the traffic
volume of a specific app.
• The geographical positions and mobility patterns. As an example, we
can study where mobile devices are most frequently used, and where
they generate most of their traffic.
In Table 5.7, we show the types of usage study carried out in the sur-
veyed works that deal with this kind of traffic analysis. In what follows, we
summarize their findings:
• The most frequently used apps are the ones related to multimedia
content (e.g., YouTube, Spotify) and web browsers [120, 122, 125,
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Table 5.7: The surveyed works that deal with usage study.
Year Paper Network Apps/Mobile Services Geography/Mobility
2010
Afanasyev et al. [119] 4 4 4
Falaki et al. [120] 4
Maier et al. [122] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [124] 4
Gember et al. [125] 4
Lee et al. [126] 4 4
2012 Ham et al. [130] 4 4
2015
Fukuda et al. [148] 4
Soikkeli et al. [151] 4 4
2017 Wei et al. [171] 4
126, 130, 148]. Social network and instant messaging apps are also
popular [148].
• The predominance of cellular over Wi-Fi network traffic observed for
mobile devices by Ham and Choi in 2012 [130] is gradually disappear-
ing. As reported in [148], in 2015 more than half of mobile traffic is
carried over Wi-Fi. In particular, mobile users tend to switch to Wi-Fi
connectivity whenever a Wi-Fi access point is available [148].
• The usage of mobile devices is low at nighttime and high in day-
time [119, 126, 130, 151].
• Cellular traffic peaks in commute times, while Wi-Fi traffic peaks in
the evening [148]. Cellular traffic is lighter on weekends than weekdays,
while Wi-Fi traffic follows the opposite trend [148].
• Mobile users tend to generate more network traffic when they are out
of home, and when their devices have high battery level [151].
• The volume of traffic generated by the mobile users of a Wi-Fi network
varies greatly, from less than 100 MB to several GBs, according to
users’ habits and needs [171].
• According to Finamore et al. in [124], YouTube users on mobile de-
vices: (i) similarly to non-mobile users, they prefer short videos (40%
of the watched videos are shorter than three minutes, and only 5%
are longer than ten minutes); (ii) similarly to non-mobile users, they
rarely change video resolution and, whenever they do that, it is to
switch to a higher resolution (although full screen mode is not fre-
quently used); and (iii) more frequently than non-mobile users, they
early stop watching the video (within the first fifth of its duration for
60% of the videos).
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5.2.7 User Action Identification
Most of the apps can leverage the Wi-Fi and cellular network interfaces of
mobile devices to send and receive data. Since users perform several actions
while interacting with apps, it is likely that most of such actions generate
data transmissions. The network traffic trace of a given action typically
follows a pattern that depends on the nature of the user-app interaction of
that action. As a practical example, browsing a user’s profile on Facebook
will likely produce a different traffic pattern compared to posting a message
on Twitter. These patterns can be used to recognize specific user actions
related to a particular app of interest in generic network traces. Moreover, it
is often possible to infer specific information about a given user action (e.g.,
the length of the message sent via an instant messaging app). We define as
user action identification these types of traffic analysis.
The possibility to identify actions of mobile users can be useful in several
scenarios:
• It is possible to profile the habits of a mobile user (e.g., checking emails
in the morning, watching YouTube videos in the evening). The user’s
behavioral profile can be used to later recognize the presence of that
user in a network. Moreover, profiles of thousands of mobile users
can be aggregated in order to infer some information for marketing or
intelligence purposes.
• It is possible to perform user de-anonymization. Suppose a national
agency is trying to discover the identity of a dissident spreading anti-
government propaganda on a social network. It is possible to monitor
a suspect and detect when she posts messages via the social network
mobile app. The inferred posting timestamps can be matched with
the time of the messages on the dissident social profile in order to
understand if the suspect is actually the dissident.
In Table 5.8, we show the app categories covered by the surveyed works
that deal with user action identification [140, 142, 150, 45, 162]. Almost all
the works target communication apps, which belong to the most privacy-
sensitive app category. This category includes instant messaging apps (e.g.,
iMessage, KakaoTalk, WhatsApp) as well as email clients (e.g., Gmail, Ya-
hoo Mail). Another sensitive category is social (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
Tumblr), which is targeted in [45, 162]. Apps related to multimedia con-
tents (e.g., YouTube) are considered in [140, 162]. Moreover, Saltaformaggio
et al. in [162] also focus on other categories of apps: dating (e.g., Tinder),
health (e.g., HIV Atlas), maps (e.g., Yelp), news (e.g., CNN News), and
shopping (e.g., Amazon). The works in [140, 45] cover productivity apps
(e.g., Dropbox), and Watkins et al. in [140] also consider mobile games
(e.g., Temple Run 2) and utility apps (e.g., ZArchiver).
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Table 5.8: App categories that deal with user action identification.
Year Paper
Covered App Categories
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2013 Watkins et al. [140] 4 4 4 4
2014 Coull et al. [142] 4
2015 Park et al. [150] 4
2016
Conti et al. [45] 4 4 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [162] 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Watkins et al. in [140] develop a framework that exploits the inter-packet
time of responses to ICMP packets (i.e., pings) to infer the type of action
that the target user is performing on her mobile device. In particular, the
authors focus on three types of user action: (i) CPU intensive; (ii) I/O
intensive; and (iii) non-CPU intensive. First of all, the authors check the
feasibility of their approach for the Android and iOS platforms, showing that
unfortunately their solution does not work for the latter because iOS does
not use CPU throttling. Subsequently, they evaluate their framework using
six Android apps, achieving a minimum 93% accuracy. Since the proposed
solution exploits the timing of packets, it is not affected by traffic encryption.
Coull and Dyer in [142] target iMessage, Apple’s instant messaging ser-
vice, which is available as an app for iOS or a computer application for
OS X. The proposed analysis leverages the sizes of the packets exchanged
between the target user and Apple’s servers, thus it works despite all iMes-
sage communications are encrypted. The authors focus on five user actions:
“start typing”, “stop typing”, “send text”, “send attachment”, and “read
receipt”. Assuming to have correctly inferred that the target mobile device
is running iOS, all user actions can be classified with over 99% accuracy,
except for the “read receipt” action that is often confused with the “start
typing” action. The authors also aim to infer the language (among six
languages: Chinese, English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish) and
length of the exchanged messages. Assuming to have correctly identified an
iMessage action on a mobile device running iOS, the language classification
achieves more than 80% accuracy by considering the first 50 packets. Be-
sides, the length classification achieves an average error of 6.27 characters
for text messages, and an absolute error of less than 10 bytes for attachment
transfers.
Park and Kim in [150] target KakaoTalk, an instant messaging service
widely used in Korea. They consider eleven actions that a user can per-
form on the Android app (e.g., join a chat room, send a message, add a
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friend). For each action, the proposed framework learns its traffic pattern
as a sequence of packets. Such sequence is then used to recognize that spe-
cific action in unseen network traces. The proposed solution reaches 99.7%
accuracy despite KakaoTalk traffic is encrypted.
Conti et al. in [45] present an identification framework which leverages
the information available in IP and TCP headers (e.g., source and desti-
nation IP addresses) and therefore it works even if the network traffic is
encrypted via SSL/TLS. However, the proposed approach does not work on
an IPsec scenario, since it relies on (IP address, TCP port) pairs to separate
traffic flows. The authors target seven popular Android apps (namely Drop-
box, Evernote, Facebook, Gmail, Google+, Tumblr, and Twitter), reaching
over 95% accuracy and precision for most of the actions, and outperform-
ing websites fingerprinting algorithms by Liberatore and Levine [172] and
Herrmann et al. [173].
Saltaformaggio et al. in [162] present NetScope, a user action identifica-
tion system that can be deployed at Wi-Fi access points or other network
equipments. Since it leverages IP headers/metadata, NetScope can be em-
ployed even if the network traffic is protected by IPsec. The authors evaluate
their solution by considering 35 user actions from 22 apps across two plat-
forms (i.e., Android and iOS) and eight app categories. The identification
accuracy reaches average precision and recall of 78.04% and 76.04% respec-
tively, performing better for Android devices rather than iOS ones.
5.2.8 User Fingerprinting
Mobile users interact actively with their devices, leveraging the nearly ubiq-
uitous Internet connectivity and the capabilities of the apps available in the
marketplaces. To each mobile user, it is possible to associate a set of pre-
ferred (i.e., most frequently used) apps and, for each of these apps, a set
of preferred (i.e., most frequently executed) actions. Since most of the mo-
bile apps are able to connect to the Internet, and many user actions within
them trigger data transmission through the network, it becomes clear that
the network traffic generated by a user is likely to present a fairly constant
pattern across different devices, as well as across different networks. We
define as user fingerprinting the attempt to exploit such pattern in order to
recognize the network traffic belonging to a specific mobile user. This type
of analysis can be applied to:
• Recognize the presence of a specific mobile user within a network.
Once the network is identified, it is then possible to approximate
the geographical position of that user with the location of the Wi-
Fi hotspot or cellular station to which her mobile device is connected.
• Partition the network traces of a mobile traffic dataset by user. Once
the transmissions related to a specific mobile user have been separated
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and grouped together, it is then possible to apply other types of traffic
analysis targeting that user.
In this section, we review the works that deal with mobile user fingerprint-
ing. Vanrykel et al. in [164] investigate how mobile unencrypted traffic can
be exploited for user surveillance. The authors develop a framework to auto-
matically execute apps, collect their network traffic, inspect the HTTP data,
and identify the sensitive identifiers that are transmitted in clear. Moreover,
the authors present a graph building technique that exploits such identifiers
to extract the network traces generated by a specific mobile user from a
traffic dataset. The analysis of 1260 Android apps (from 42 app categories)
shows that the proposed solution can link 57% of a mobile user’s unencrypted
network traffic. In addition, the authors observe the limited effectiveness of
ad-blocking apps in preventing the leakage of sensitive identifiers.
Verde et al. in [146] present a system being able to accurately infer
when a target user is connected to a given network and her IP address,
even though she is hidden behind NAT among thousands of other users.
To achieve this objective, a machine learning classifier is trained with the
NetFlow records of the target user’s traffic, and then employed to analyze
the NetFlow records of a given network in order to detect the presence of
the target user within it. The system is evaluated as follows:
• Cross-validation is applied to the NetFlow records of the traffic gen-
erated by 26 different mobile users connecting to the Internet through
the same Wi-Fi access point. The best performing implementation
of the classifier (which is based on random forest) reaches 95% true-
positive rate, 7% false-positive rate, 0.95 precision, 0.93 recall, and
0.94 F-measure.
• To profile them, five mobile users are induced to connect to a Wi-Fi
access point under the control of the authors, who then try to detect
the presence of such users within a real-world large metropolitan Wi-Fi
network. The implementation of the classifier based on random forest
(the best performing) reaches over 90% true-positive rate, less than
8% false-positive rate, and over 0.9 precision and recall.
It is worth to notice that the proposed solution is encryption-agnostic, since
NetFlow records can be extracted even from encrypted traffic.
5.2.9 Website Fingerprinting
The Internet has a central role in people’s everyday life, and surfing the Web
has become a common task that can be performed from desktop computers,
as well as in mobility using laptops and smartphones/tablets, thanks to
the increasing deployment of cellular and Wi-Fi networks. From a privacy
point of view, the set of websites frequently visited by a user is a sensitive
77
Q. Li Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects
information, since it can disclose her interests, social habits, religious belief,
sexual preference, and political orientation.
In the field of traffic analysis, website fingerprinting generally indicates
the attempt to infer the website or even webpage visited by a user surfing
the Internet, by analyzing the network traffic generated by her web browser.
This type of analysis has been extensively treated in the domain of personal
computers, where machine learning techniques have been proved to be very
effective [172, 173, 174]. Since we focus on mobile devices, in this section
we survey the works that target users navigating through the web browser
of their mobile devices.
Spreitzer et al. in [163] develop an Android app being able to capture the
data-usage statistics of the browser app, and leverage them to fingerprint
the webpages visited by the user of the mobile device on which that app is
installed. This solution is not affected by encryption, since it only requires
to know the amount of data transmitted and received by the browser app
(which is easily obtainable in Android). The proposed app is evaluated on a
set of 500 possible pages that the user can visit. Overall, 97% of 2,500 page
visits are correctly inferred. The authors also evaluate their fingerprinting
app when the network traffic is protected by Tor (in particular, by using the
Orbot proxy and the Orweb browser). Out of a set of 100 possible pages
that the user can visit, 95% of 500 page visits are correctly inferred.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we surveyed the state of the art of the work for analyzing
the network traffic generated by mobile devices. In particular, we are the
first that surveyed the works in which the mobile traffic is captured from
alternative sources to cellular networks: Wi-Fi monitors and access points;
wired networks; logging apps installed on mobile devices; and networks of
mobile devices simulated via software. Moreover, we observed that the most
frequently used approach to capture mobile traffic is logging at either wired
networks or mobile devices themselves. We provide a systematic classifica-
tion of the state of the art according to the goal of the analysis that targets
the network traffic of mobile devices. In particular, we realized that most
of the work focus on studying the features of the network traffic generated
by mobile devices, especially related to Human-Computer Interaction, such
as user action identification, usage study, and Personal Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII) leakage. While a lot of work has been done on such goals,
promising topics, such as user fingerprinting and sociological inference, still
offer much space for further investigation. Regarding the feasibility of the
surveyed analyses in case of traffic encryption, we observed that 36 out of
56 work proposed methods that are able to carry out the analysis on traffic
encrypted with SSL/TLS, while only 19 out of 36 can handle network traffic
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encrypted with IPsec. As in the traditional network traffic domain, the fea-
sibility of the analysis on the encrypted traffic of mobile devices is bounded
to the network layer in which the traffic has been captured.
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Chapter 6
Network Traffic Management via
SDN
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging networking architec-
ture which advocates better decoupling between network control (control
plane) and data forwarding functionalities (data plane). In SDN [175], con-
trol plane manages a collection of OpenFlow-enabled switches in data plane
which is responsible for data processing and forwarding. The functional
separation makes the management of SDN network more flexible, which al-
lows the users and administrators to design their own software routine to
dynamically manage the network. Network management is becoming more
and more vexing, since network administrators perform increasingly sophis-
ticated network management tasks. Moreover, if the configurations [17] are
based on some advanced commands, it is error prone for the users who rely
on the Graphical User Interface (GUI) to manage and operate the network.
The two main causes of errors are the dynamically changing network state
and low-level network configuration. The state-of-the-art methods for net-
work management do not allow users to configure network policies automat-
ically reacting to low-level dynamic network activities. Compared with the
traditional network, SDN provides several benefits for improving network
management [176], thanks to its functional separation in different layers.
The first benefit introduced by a SDN architecture is that instead of using
set of abstract and error-prone commands, SDN makes it feasible to manip-
ulate the network devices by easily designing, distributing innovative flow
handling and network control algorithms. Second, centralized SDN allows
to configure all the network devices once if there are changes of network
behavior. Third, SDN supports the abstraction of network configuration re-
lying on controllers (e.g., Floodlight [177], NOX/POX [178], OpenDaylight
(ODL) [179]), which get global knowledge of network state and support au-
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tomatically reacting to dynamic network events. However, there still exist
a stark paucity of programming SDN security applications. In this chapter,
we present GolfEngine, a novel SDN management architecture, providing
users with a tool to build their security applications for SDN network. Our
proposal offers an intuitive GUI for managing and monitoring the state of
the whole system. Indeed, GolfEngine users will be able to define rules
and design their security application even without any programming knowl-
edge. Designing an application, GolfEngine also helps users to check policy
conflicts. Furthermore, our GolfEngine provides the mechanism to check
data storage redundancy, which improves the network security application
efficiency.
Chapter Organization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In
Section 6.1, we briefly survey the state of the art of SDN network manage-
ment. We give a detailed description of our SDN management architecture,
GolfEngine in Section 6.2. In order to illustrate the work flow of GolfEngine
concretely, a use case Firewall is presented in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4,
we describe simulation and evaluation results. We conclude the chapter in
Section 6.5.
6.1 Related Work
Several works have contributed a lot to improve the security management
of SDN network. M.K. Shin et al. in [180] discussed a SDN reference archi-
tecture and APIs for networking environment. In order to assure network
security and correctness, the work in [181] helped the controller developers
make their programming efficient through measuring OF switches perfor-
mance. They pay attention on analyzing control plane processing times and
flow table update rate. Instead, our GolfEngine is designed on top of control
plane to solve the SDN network management. Shin et al. in [182] proposed
FRESCO, an OF security application development framework designed to
facilitate the rapid design. Such framework allowed to design modules to
perform complex OF-enabled network security services (e.g., detection and
mitigation modules), which can be built from smaller sharable libraries of
security functions. Nevertheless, FRESCO design scale was at module level
and it required users to have a medium level skill with Python programming
language in order to develop application modules. Moreover, FRESCO was
based on the NOX controller. Instead, GolfEnigne is based on ODL con-
troller and it is system-level for designing security application with free con-
flict. Authors in [176, 183] designed and implemented PROCERA, an event-
driven framework for high-level reactive SDN network control. It simplified
network operations and management from three aspects: enabling changing
network conditions and state frequently; providing supports for high-level
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language for low-level network configuration and policy; and supplying bet-
ter visibility and control over tasks for performing network anomalies. M.
Monaco et al. in [184] introduced YANC, a controller platform for SDN.
They considered the network configuration and state as a file system, which
allows users and system applications to interact through standard file I/O,
and to easily leverage tools available on the host operating system. They
completed a demonstration with a simple static flow pusher application. In
literature [185], authors proposed an extended SDN architecture that enables
fast customized packet handling. They focused on the data plane processing
according to applications deployment. In [186], they introduced FortNOX, a
SDN application extension that provides authorization and security enforce-
ment based on NOX controller. FortNOX allowed NOX to check flow rule
contradictions in real-time. Moreover, they demonstrated the performance
and efficiency of FortNOX through a prototype implementation. Compared
with FortNOX, GolfEngine not only provides the mechanism of avoid com-
munication redundancy, but also it improves the efficiency of process policy
contradictions. In the work [187, 188, 189], authors talked about firewall
policy based on traditional network. They gave definition of rule relation
and kind of rule conflicts and also the algorithm to check the conflicts. More-
over, in order to check the conflict, they adopt the mechanism of designing
the policy tree to compare with every new rule. Authors in [190] presented
FireWell, a firewall policy analyzer based on Alloy to detect conflicts of
policies in SDN network. Firewall read, validate, detect and prevent pol-
icy conflicts from SDN Floodlight controller in Firewall application. They
focused on evaluating and optimizing the performance of the conflict detec-
tion. Besides, they mapped firewall policies into Alloy models to translate
abstract policies. Different from them, a use case of GolfEngine (e.g., Fire-
wall) redesigns the rule format, redefine relation between two rules, and
redevelop algorithm for conflict checking. GolfEngine amazingly improves
the efficiency of conflict detection comparing to the work [187].
6.2 GolfEngine Architecture
We name our network management architecture for SDN GolfEngine, be-
cause we expect our proposal to achieve our target as the way playing a golf
into a hole. In this section, first we give a brief introduction of GolfEngine
architecture layers. Then we illustrate each layer in detail.
6.2.1 Architecture Introduction
As shown in Figure 6.1, the left part shows the normal SDN architecture,
consisting of Data Plane, Control Plane and Application Layer. Normal
SDN architecture offers an application layer to develop, test, and run ap-
plication to control the network security operation. Besides, the OF proto-
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col enables switches to communicate with the controller and the controller
to manage the switches. The right part of Figure 6.1 depicts GolfEngine
architecture. The red, green, yellow and blue part represent GolfEngine
Application, User Interface, Database, and Runtime Manager, respectively.
  Data Plane
  Control Plane SDN Controller
Application Layer SDN Application
(3) 
Runtime 
Manager (2) 
Database
(1) User 
Interface
APP1
APP2
APP3
GolfEngine
  Data Plane
  Control Plane SDN Controller
Normal SDN 
Architecture
Figure 6.1: Structure comparison between GolfEngine and normal SDN.
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Figure 6.2: GolfEngine architecture.
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In Figure 6.2, we show the structure of GolfEngine layers in a more de-
tailed schema. GolfEngine system works on top of SDN controller using the
Northbound API, which is like a luxuriant application layer for the origi-
nal SDN prototype. GolfEngine consists of the three aforementioned layers,
User Interface, Database, and Runtime Manager. GolfEngine not only al-
lows users to design their own proprietary GolfEngine Application via User
Interface, but also Runtime Manager supports users to manage the network
dynamically and design policy conflict-free GolfEngine Applications.
In the following sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4, we give a description of
these three layers of GolfEngine.
6.2.2 User Interface
User Interface is the first layer of GolfEngine. It provides convenient en-
trance for users to design applications and check on-time network statistic
and running applications, and network topology. More in detail, User In-
terface implements four functions:
• Design applications: It is the main function of User Interface layer.
As a proof of concept, we implement three kind of security applications
for users to design: Firewall, HoneyPot, and DDoS Mitigate.
• Visualization of the network topology: Users have under their
control the status of the whole virtual network thanks to an intuitive
graphical representation of its topology.
• Get network flow: Network administrators can check network flows
properties (e.g., packet number, bytes number, bandwidth), and GUI
can allows users to visually observe such data in a given time interval.
• Check running applications: This function allows users to check
the applications which is running on GolfEngine platform.
In summary, the GUI design significantly simplifies the management, while
minimizing network vulnerability of misconfiguration.
6.2.3 Database
This layer of GolfEngine architecture assures applications of a good commu-
nication between users and SDN controller. In our prototype implementa-
tion of GolfEngine, we utilize MySQL as database managing system to store
the data for the implementation of GolfEngine. Database layer is comprised
of three stand-alone types of data:
• Application Policies Database stores elements that users may need
to design their own applications. We pre-define several useful policies
according to the users’ requirements of designing applications. We
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store into the database three types of application policies: (i) polling
policy (e.g., polling the number of packets through a specific switch),
(ii) analysis policy (e.g., comparing the value given in polling policy
with a specific threshold) and (iii) action policy (e.g., drop, forward).
• Network Flows Database stores all the networking statistics, which
are polled by controller from switches. Such database is updated at a
specified time interval in order to guarantee the freshness of collected
network data. GolfEngine applications monitor such data in order to
promptly react to network events with on-time. Unfortunately, moni-
toring network behavior at application level increases the communica-
tion load between the controller and switches. In order to cope with
this problem and avoid data storage redundancy and communication
redundancy, we adopt a GolfEngine system-level mechanism Network
Status Coordinator (NSC) (see detail in Section 6.2.7) as a delegate
to communicate with applications.
• User Information Database is used to log users’ operations done
on GolfEngine platform. GolfEngine logs in this database the behav-
ior of each user and every relevant information users set during the
applications designing process. As a practical example, a user who
wants to design an application on GolfEngine to monitor the network,
must register with an unique username. After the system administra-
tors grant her the permission, she can select the desired application
from our application list (e.g., Firewall). Thus, after choosing the ap-
plication, she is allowed to set up some parameters according to her
requirements for managing network. The corresponding information
for her application requirements and parameters are recorded into User
Information Database. As a future work, we can use machine learning
techniques to analyze users’ behavior and information.
6.2.4 Runtime Manager
Runtime Manager is the core layer of GolfEngine. The main contribution of
GolfEngine is implemented by Runtime Manager layer. Runtime Manager
layer is in charge of tracing, monitoring, reacting dynamically against critical
network events (e.g., DDoS). It consists of three components:
• Scheduler: Similar to an operating system, in a SDN system, ap-
plications concurrently run sharing computational and networking re-
sources. Therefore, the Runtime Manager relies on a scheduler to
manage all the running applications in order to strictly regulate their
access to resources, avoiding deadlocks or resource starvation.
• Network Status Coordinator: It is a system-level application that
polls network data from switches and stores into database to avoid
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communication redundancy. See detail in Section 6.2.7. In case two
different applications poll different data from switches independently,
it will not occur communication redundancy. However, if these two ap-
plications poll the same data, they will request the controller to poll
the same data from switches twice. Such overlapped communication
between the controller and same switches for same data wastes both
network resources and time. Introducing NSC mechanism, applica-
tions first request NSC for the data. If such requested data have been
already cached in Network Flows Database by the NSC due to another
recent request (i.e., cache hit), NSC sends to applications directly. Or
else (i.e., cache miss) NSC polls the requested data from switches and
stores it into Network Flows Database.
• Policy Conflict Detection: It is a mechanism that handles flow
rules (responding to/interact with networking behaviors) from out-
puts of applications and the action policy (see Section 6.2.3). PCD is
responsible for detecting the anomalous conflict among action policies.
A policy conflict is defined as a phenomenon, in which more different
filtering rules match to the same packet. This phenomenon contains
conflicts that cause some rules to be always subverted by other rules,
or warnings for potential conflicts between related rules. First, PCD
checks the relation of policy based on the fields of the policy rules.
Then, it detects the conflict anomaly according to the relation, pri-
ority level and action. We describe in detail the PCD algorithm in
Section 6.3.4.
In what follows, we describe the components of Runtime Manager layer in
detail in Sections 6.2.5, 6.2.6 and 6.2.7.
6.2.5 GolfEngine Applications
Besides designing the architecture for SDN, we also design our own SDN
applications for GolfEngine, especially network security applications (e.g.,
Firewall, HoneyPot, DDoS Mitigate). As depicted by Figure 6.2, each
GolfEngine application is composed of three parts:
• Profile: This part consists of a pair made of a basic policy and a
network topology.
• Runtime States: It monitors at runtime the network status based
on the applications’ rules.
• Actor: It is sub-divided into input and output. An application gets
the network status from input APIs. Applying basic policy, the appli-
cation generates actions and sends command to system’s PCD com-
ponent through output APIs.
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We give an example to illustrate the work-flow of Firewall application de-
signed with GolfEngine. Regarding the profile part, the topology for Fire-
wall is topology of a network domain. There are three policies for Firewall:
Polling policy is polling the number of packets transmitted through Switch
1 every 5 seconds. Analysis policy is whether this number is bigger than the
given threshold 200. And action policy is blocking the traffic if the number
is more than 200. In the runtime states part, Firewall application refreshes
the network status (traffic through Switch 1) at a specific time interval (e.g.,
5 seconds) to get the latest data. For actor part, the input is the network
statistic (e.g., the number of packets transmitted through Switch 1) that
Firewall application needs to make its decision, while the output is the ac-
tion (e.g., block the traffic through Switch 1). When designing GolfEngine
applications, we provide different APIs for users to design their customized
applications.
6.2.6 Policy Conflict Detection (PCD)
Policy conflict is defined as a phenomenon that more than one different
filtering rules matching the same packet. This includes clear conflicts that
cause some rules to be always suppressed by other rules, or warnings for
potential conflicts between related rules.
PCD is responsible for detecting the anomalous conflict among the
policies. As shown in Figure 6.3, we provide the work-flow of PCD in
GolfEngine.
First, we provide users the interface to create policies, according to a rule
encoded in a specific format (for example the rule for Firewall application
is shown in Figure 6.5). Subsequently, PCD optimizes the rules, on the
basis of each field value provided by users in the previous step. In case of
conflict-free scenario, PCD simply stores this rule into Application Policies
Database. For the time being, GolfEngine checks the rules stored in the
database that are still not yet executed but valid, and sends to the SDN
controller. In case rule has conflict with the existing rules, PCD returns
users an alert to delete and add a new one instead of modifying. We opt
for this designing choice because of the results reported in [181], where the
authors show that modifying a rule is slower than deleting it and adding an
updated rule.
6.2.7 Network Statistic Coordinator (NSC)
In GolfEngine, we include a component NSC to cope with communication
redundancy issue. Different GolfEngine applications may poll the same net-
work information from the controller independently, thus communications
between the controller and switches are redundant. However, when different
applications poll different network data from the controller independently,
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Figure 6.3: Policy conflict detection principle.
there does not exist communication redundancy. In what follows, we present
an example for redundant communication problem. Given an Application A1
that wants to get the bandwidth information between Switch Xand Switch
Y , thus Application A1 will poll bandwidth information through the con-
troller. Without any coordinator in place, whether Application A2 also
wants to get the same information that Application A1 previously polled,
Application A2 will ask the controller such information again. Such over-
lapped communication between the controller and same switches for same
data wastes both network resources and time. Besides, applications waste
a not negligible amount of time waiting of controller’s reply and to get the
desired data.
NSC is a system level component, which is used to store the data polled
from switches and hosts into database to avoid communication redundancy.
Here we present again the same scenario of the previous example but with
the NSC in place. Given an Application A1 tries to poll the bandwidth
information between Switch Xand Switch Y , it sends a request to NSC first.
NSC checks whether Network Flows Database has already cached this data.
If cached, NSC forwards the data to Application A1 directly. If there is no
corresponding data, NSC polls this data from the controller and stores into
Network Flows Database. Later if Application A2 wants the same data with
Application A1, it can directly get the data from the local database, which
saves a lot of time compared with the previous scenario. It is worth noting
that with our NSC in place not only can avoid resource wasting, but it can
also save time in retrieving the network data.
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6.3 A Use Case for GolfEngine Security Applica-
tion: A Firewall
In order to better comprehend GolfEngine operating principle, we present
a use case of a Firewall application to concretely illustrate step by step the
development of an application with GolfEngine. Firewalls are core elements
in the field of network security. Based on a specific security policy, fire-
walls control network packets direction, whether the packets are allowed to
traverse across the boundaries of a secured network. Firewall policy is inter-
preted by ODL controller to define actions and rules to process the network
traffic. Moreover, the optimization of policies plays a crucial role in making
a firewall stronger against DoS and DDoS attacks. For the sake of security
and efficiency of a network, firewall rules have to be conflict-free. We can
find some work talking about firewall conflicts in traditional network [191]
and SDN network [190].
The firewall security policy consists of a list of filtering firewall rules
executed by order. In the following, we describe our rule format for Firewall
of GolfEngine in Section 6.3.1, the mechanism of detecting policy conflict in
Section 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.
6.3.1 Firewall Rule Format
The firewall security policy consists of a list of filtering rules executed by or-
der. These policies are used to define constraints, limitations and authoriza-
tion on the network data and communication. The filtering rule decides the
action for the packets which match the rule. The filtering rule is composed
of several related fields (e.g., protocol type, source IP address, destination IP
address, source port and destination port, and an action) with packets. For
the sake of compatibility, Firewall rule format should not only conform to
traditional firewalls standards [191], but also support OF-enabled switches.
As described in OpenFlow white paper [192], an OF-enabled switch has one
or more flow tables installed by the controller. A flow table is a set of flow
entries, while a flow entry consists of several filter fields, counters, and a set
of instructions (see Figure 6.4). These filter fields are corresponding to the
fields described in tradition Firewall [193], while the instructions in the flow
entry correspond to the actions of Firewall.
Match Fields Priority Counters Instructions Timeouts Cookie
Figure 6.4: The format of flow entry on OF switches.
In GolfEngine architecture, we design a classic and popular security ap-
plication Firewall, whose rule format is shown in the first row of Figure 6.5.
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• priority: The value in this field represents priority level of this rule ex-
ecuted by the controller. The value is between 0 and 65535. The bigger
value, the higher priority to be executed. The default value is hashing
the timestamps when users create rules. Priority field is closely associ-
ated with the conflict of policy (see detail in Section 6.3.3). Moreover,
PCD not only checks the rules with those who have priority higher
than n, but also checks with those who have priority lower than n.
• protocol: The value can be TCP, UDP, IP and so on.
• src ip; dst ip: They represent source and destination IP address,
respectively. The value can be a specific IP address (e.g., 10.0.0.1) or
even whole network (i.e., *.*.*.*).
• src port; dst port: They represent the source and destination port,
whose value can be a specific value (e.g., 80, 53) or a general value
(e.g., any).
• valid time: The value of this field indicates the length of time during
which a rule will be valid on the controller.
• action: The policy actions in Firewall are either to accept or to deny.
In our use case application, the default policy action is set to “deny”.
In order to develop a Firewall application, it is necessary to model Firewall
rule according to the function of each field. In the following sections, we
define the relation of two rules, the conflict classification and detect conflict
based on this rule model. For these fields, five of them are used to define the
relation between two rules. Subsequently, the relation, the field of priority
and action are leveraged together by PCD to detect any conflict (shown in
Figure 6.5). The algorithm used by PCD for conflict detection is described
in detail in Section 6.3.4.
priority protocol src_ip src_port dst_ip dst_port valid_timeaction
relation priority action
conflict
Figure 6.5: The format of Firewall rule.
6.3.2 Rule Relation
The five following fields (i.e., protocol, src ip, dst ip, src port and dst port)
are included into rule relations. We classify the relations into five types:
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• SAME (Rx value = Ry value): If two rules keep a SAME relation,
it means that these five fields values in Rx exactly equal to the corre-
sponding fields in Ry.
• SUB (Rx value ⊂ Ry value): If two rules keep a SUB relation, it
means there exists at least one field value in Rx is a proper subset of
the related field in Ry, while the remaining fields in Rx are exactly
equal to Ry.
• SUPER (Rx value ⊃ Ry value): If two rules keep a SUPER relation,
it means there exists at least one field value in Rx is a proper superset
of the field in Ry, while the rest fields in Rx are exactly equal to Ry.
• SUBSUPER (Rx value⊂⊃Ry value): If two rules keep a SUBSUPER
relation, it means that some fields in Rx are subsets or equal to the
corresponding fields in Ry, and the rest fields in Rx are supersets of
the corresponding fields in Ry.
• EMPTY (Rx value∅Ry value): Such relation means that at least
one field in Rx is not equal to, proper subset, and superset of the
corresponding field in Ry.
6.3.3 Policy Conflict Classification
The ordering of rules in a security policy is crucial in designing the firewall
policy. This is because the firewall packet filtering process is performed
by sequentially matching the packet against filtering rules until a match
is found. Therefore, if the ordering of conflicting rules is not processed
carefully, it will result in producing an improper security policy and action.
Here we give a clear definition of these four kinds of conflicts, especially the
value of action, the ordering of two rules.
• SHADOWED: Rx is shadowed by Ry iff:
– (i) Rx priority < Ry priority; (ii) Rx action 6= Ry action; and
(iii) Rx value ⊆ Ry value.
The third constraint means that Rx and Ry keep a SAME or SUB
relation. We consider SHADOWED as an error. One reason is because
the shadowed rule will never be executed, which means a waste of time
and space resources. Another reason is that SHADOWED conflict
might block network traffic that should be permitted and vice versa.
• GENERALIZATION: Rx is a generalization of Ry iff:
– (i) Rx priority < Ry priority; (ii) Rx action 6= Ry action; and
(iii) Rx ⊇ Ry.
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The third constraint represents that Rx and Ry keep a SAME or SU-
PER relation. It is just considered as a warning.
• CORRELATION: Rx and Ry have a correlation conflict in one of
the following two conditions:
1. (i) Rx priority > Ry priority; (iii) Rx action 6= Ry action; and
(iii)Rx value⊆⊇Ry value.
2. (i) Rx priority < Ry priority; (ii) Rx action 6= Ry action; and
(iii) Rx value⊆⊇Ry value.
The third constraint is explained in Section 6.3.2. Moreover, CORRE-
LATION is considered as a warning.
• REDUNDANT: Rx is redundant to Ry if these two rules satisfy one
of the following two conditions:
1. (i) Rx priority > Ry priority; (ii) Rx action = Ry action; and
(iii) Rx value ⊆ Ry value.
2. (i) Rx priority < Ry priority; (ii) Rx action = Ry action; and
(iii) Rx value ⊆ Ry value.
For the second condition in REDUNDANT, we also consider it as
a redundant conflict, while F. A. Maldonado-Lopez et al. in [190]
ignore this situation. For example, Rx is redundant to Ry. Even if
they exchange the ordering between Rx and Ry (it is priority in our
GolfEngine), they are still redundant to each other. REDUNDANT is
considered as an error. For the first condition, even if Rx is removed
from the Firewall application, it makes no difference for packets which
match this rule. For the second condition, Rx will never be executed.
Therefore, for both of these two conditions, redundant rules occupy
space of the flow table, increasing the searching time as well.
It is worth to notice that, for these four definitions, we are different
from the work [190] and [194], since we take the field of priority and
different scenarios into consideration.
6.3.4 Algorithms for Policy Conflict Detecting
Policy Conflict Detection (PCD) is a component to assure our GolfEngine
system to be conflict-free. In this section, we describe our three main algo-
rithms for detecting conflict. In what follows, we briefly describe the process
of our PCD algorithms:
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Insert a new rule
The aim of Algorithm 1 is to find a proper position for each rule according
to its priority. Once it is set in the proper position, we can leverage the
following two algorithms on every two rules among the rules set.
Algorithm 1 Insert a new rule
1: insertRule (rule a):
2: position found = 0
3: for i in Rules.size do
4: if rule a.priority > Rules[i].priority then
5: Rules.insert (i, rule a)
6: position found = i
7: end if
8: end for
9: if position found = 0 then
10: Rules.insert (rule a)
11: end if
Discover the relation between two rules
In order to determine the exact type of conflict, we check the relation be-
tween two rules. However, it is not necessary to identify all the relations
described in Section 6.3.2. Because if two rules have EMPTY relation, they
are conflict-free. In Algorithm 2, we discover the relations leading to con-
flicts.
Decide the classification of conflicts
Algorithm 3 is to decide the classification of conflict between two rules based
on the definition for conflicts category in Section 6.3.3. After inserting a rule
into a Firewall policy, we can be in two cases. In the first case, a conflict
warning has been reported (i.e., GENERALIZATION, CORRELATED) be-
tween rule a and the rule sets already deployed in Firewall, then rule a is
allowed to be inserted into the Firewall application as a “good” rule. In the
second case, a conflict error has been reported (i.e., REDUNDANT, SHAD-
OWED), thus the network manager can decide to insert rule a into Firewall
or not according to its priority. For example, if rule a is contradictory with
a lower priority rule, the one who has conflict with rule a is removed from
the Firewall application. However, if rule a is conflicted with a higher prior-
ity rule, rule a will be filtered by PCD. The algorithms by Ehab S. Al-Shaer
et al. [187] and Ferney A. Maldonado-Lopez et al. [190] adopt Policy Tree
to check the conflict. Compared with their algorithms, our algorithms not
only ensure the correctness and the usability of our GolfEngine, but also
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Algorithm 2 Discover relation between two rules
1: discoverRelation (rule a, field a, rule b, field b, relation):
2: if field a != ACTION then
3: if field a = field b then
4: if relation = null then
5: relation = SAME
6: end if
7: discoverRelation (rule a, field a.next, rule b, field b.next,
relation)
8: end if
9: if field a ⊂ field b then
10: if relation = SUPER then
11: discoverRelation (rule a, field a.next, rule b, field b.next,
SUBSUPER)
12: end if
13: if relation = SAME or SUB or null then
14: discoverRelation (rule a, field a.next, rule b, field b.next,
SUB)
15: end if
16: end if
17: if field a ⊃ field b then
18: if relation = SUB then
19: discoverRelation (rule a, field a.next, rule b, field b.next,
SUBSUPER)
20: end if
21: if relation = SAME or SUPER or null then
22: discoverRelation (rule a, field a.next, rule b, field b.next,
SUPER)
23: end if
24: end if
25: else
26: decideClassification (rule a, rule b, relation)
27: end if
they reduce the computation complexity, and improve the efficiency and
performance.
6.4 Simulation and Evaluation
In the prototype implementation, we build GolfEngine framework on Open-
DayLight (ODL) that is a SDN controller written in Java. Besides, ODL
supports OF protocol which allows the communication between controller
and OF switches. However, we underline that our framework can be easily
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Algorithm 3 Decide the classification of conflicts
1: decideClassification (rule a, rule b, relation):
2: if rule a.priority < rule b.priority then
3: if rule a.action = rule b.action then
4: if relation = SUB or relation = SAME then
5: Report (rule a, REDUNDANT, rule b)
6: end if
7: else
8: if relation = SUB or relation = SAME then
9: Report (rule a, SHADOWED, rule b)
10: end if
11: if relation = SUBSUPER then
12: Report (rule a, CORRELATED, rule b)
13: end if
14: if relation = SUPER or relation = SAME then
15: Report (rule a, GENERALIZATION, rule b)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
19: if rule a.priority > rule b.priority then
20: if rule a.action = rule b.action then
21: if relation = SUB or relation = SAME then
22: Report (rule a, REDUNDANT, rule b)
23: end if
24: else
25: if relation = SUBSUPER then
26: Report (rule a, CORRELATED, rule b)
27: end if
28: end if
29: end if
adapted to work on other SDN controllers. Our simulation implementation
is done via Mininet [195].
In designing GolfEngine, we have to take into account not only its ro-
bustness and correctness, but also to ensure its efficiency. In what follows,
we first show the efficiency of PCD in Section 6.4.1, and we then assess the
optimal number of sending rules to controller for installing on the switches
in Section 6.4.2.
6.4.1 Execution Efficiency of PCD
In our experiment, for each scenario we run PCD algorithm 1000 times to get
the convincing plot. In Figure 6.6, we illustrate the results through a series of
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cumulative distribution functions representing the processing time spent (in
a log scale) to discover rule contradictions. We can notice that the processing
time of checking conflicts increases almost linearly with the number of rules
increasing. For each scenario (e.g., 1 rule, 10 rules), the values on Y-axis
represents the probability to observe a processing time smaller than the
corresponding value on X-axis. We can observe that each scenario exists
an upper bound to the processing time (i.e., the corresponding value with
p = 1.0). For example, in the scenario with 500 flow rules, the probability of
processing time less than 2ms is 0.45, moreover, the probability of processing
time smaller than 12.5ms is 1.0.
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Figure 6.6: The CDF plots illustrate PCD performance (processing time) in
conducting conflicts in scenarios (1, 10, 100, 500 and 1000 flow rules).
We adapt the same simulation setup in terms of the number of switches
and hosts, in order to compare with the algorithms in [189, 190], . The
results prove that PCD algorithm performs much more better than that
in [189, 190] with respect to execution time for discovering and processing
conflicts. In particular, it costs almost 100ms to detecting conflicts even in
the best condition in [189], while it only costs more or less 1ms (range from
0.2ms to 12ms). Moreover, for the last scenario (i.e., 1000 rules), compared
with the computational delay of FortNox in [186], our PCD algorithm per-
forms better. Moreover, it exists a corresponding value on X-axis in which
the probability reaches 1.0, while FortNox in [186] such value does not exist.
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6.4.2 Sending and Installing Rules on Switches
In our evaluation, we also take into account the time needed to send and
install rules on switches. In the literature, SDN frameworks underestimate
such important aspect [190, 189]. As an example, FireWell [190] is a type
of firewall application designed for SDN network. FireWell communicates
with the controller directly when it detects rules conflicts. Unfortunately,
such process takes time and occupies resource of the controller.
As depicted in Figure 6.3, on GolfEngine the rules produced by applica-
tions are not directly installed on the controller. Indeed, such rules are first
checked by PCD, stored into the Database, and only then conflict-free rules
are forwarded to the controller. By preventing to directly install potentially
conflicting rules on the controller, PCD component of GolfEngine is once
again more efficient than its competitors [190, 189].
However, it takes time to send the rules to the controller, hence the
problem is to try to find the optimal number of rules sent to the controller to
ensure the efficiency of GolfEngine. Table 6.1 shows the time spent for PCD
sending conflict-free rules to the controller and installing on the switches
in different scenarios (i.e., one rule, two rules, etc.). From the results in
Table 6.1, we can observe that sending and installing batches of 20 conflict-
free rules is a most time-efficient mechanism.
Table 6.1: Time spent to send rules to controller and install on switches.
Number of Rules 1 2 4 6 8 10
Time (ms) 0.5 0.79 1.53 2.53 3.2 3.6
Number of Rules 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (ms) 6.4 12.25 20.55 36.25 56.04 61.4
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we implemented and evaluated GolfEngine, our proposed ar-
chitecture for SDN network management. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to support network manager to visually operate SDN tasks
based on system level instead of module level. In GolfEngine architecture,
we solved two critical issues by introducing novel components (PCD and
NSC). One issue is how to efficiently detect and prevent potentially conflict-
ing policies designed by users. Another issue is how to avoid the possible
communication redundancy between the controller and OF switches. We
implemented a prototype of our proposal on OpenDaylight controller, but
it can be easily extended on other SDN controllers. As underlined by the
results in our evaluation, GolfEngine platform ensures the robustness, the
correctness and the efficiency of SDN network management systems.
99
Q. Li Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects
100
Part III
Energy-Efficient
Communication of IoT
Devices
101

Chapter 7
Energy-Efficient Communication of
IoT Devices
Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm that is rapidly gaining ground in
the scenario of modern wireless telecommunications. In recent years, IoT is
attracting significant attention from both academia and industry [196, 197].
IoT enables the communication between human users and smart devices,
and also between smart devices themselves. IoT can be used in the fields
of environmental monitoring [198], health-care [199], and smart cities [200].
Besides, it can be used to leverage sensor devices to gather valuable data [3]
related to Human-Computer Interaction. IoT devices are widely used as
effective transmission medium [201]. However, IoT devices considered in the
aforementioned work are restricted in terms of battery energy, processing,
memory, and transmission range.
Figure 7.1 shows a network structure of battery-powered HCI devices,
in which, the battery-powered IoT devices connect with the outside world
via one or several sinks/gateways. The sink is a base station, which is used
to collect and process data in a centralized mode. In this chapter, we use
“network”, “sink” and “nodes” to represent the IoT network, the rendezvous
point and battery-powered HCI devices, respectively.
In IoT, sensor are restricted by limited batteries and transmission range.
Thus, if sensors cannot communicate with sink directly, they leverage other
peers as forwarders to route traffic to sink. In such case, the nodes closer
to the sink carry heavier traffic loads. As a result, inner layer nodes de-
plete their energy faster than other peers [202]. Consequently, a massive
amount of energy (i.e., remaining energy in the devices far away from the
sink) is wasted and the network lifetime ends prematurely. Wadaa et al.
in [203] showed that by the time nodes closest to the sink deplete their
energy, the farther nodes may still have 93% of their initial energy avail-
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Figure 7.1: The structure of a network of battery-powered HCI devices.
able. This phenomenon is called energy hole problem [204]. In order to
cope with energy hole, researchers have proposed several approaches based
on duty cycle operation. Generally, nodes spend a large portion of power on
monitoring surrounding environment instead of communicating with other
nodes. This monitoring behavior is called idle listening [205]. In order to
save energy by idle listening and balance the energy consumption, duty cycle
ratio (i.e., periodically switching devices between sleeping mode and active
mode) is being widely used in designing protocols for the IoT network of
battery limited devices [206, 207, 208]. However, three issues exist in the
energy conservation approaches applied with duty cycle ratios. First, the
approaches assigning the same duty cycle ratio to all the nodes lead to a
quick ending of network lifetime. According to the definition of energy hole,
the inner nodes consumed more energy than the outer nodes and quickly
ran out of their energy. Without the cooperation of inner nodes, the net-
work cannot work properly and ends their lifetime quickly. Second, some
protocols distribute different duty cycle ratios for different layers’ nodes,
however, they did not take the energy consumption during network con-
struction phase. In other words, network lifetime is composed of network
construction phase and data processing phase. Third, some of them focus on
calculating energy consumption based on the concentric corona. However,
compared with concentric corona structure, clustering structure is consid-
ered an effective approach to address the energy hole problem and prolong
network lifetime [209, 210, 211]. One energy conservation approach is to
prolong the network lifetime by adjusting the duty cycle ratios, unfortu-
nately, it degrades network performance (i.e., increasing end-to-end delay).
Therefore, we propose an energy conservative approach, EnergIoT, which
could mitigate the energy hole problem and extend the network lifetime,
without sacrificing network performance.
Chapter Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We survey the state-of-the-art of the energy efficiency of battery-powered
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HCI devices in Section 7.1. In Section 7.2, we first discuss the network
structure of EnergIoT. Then, we describe the energy model considered in this
chapter. In Section 7.3, we give a detailed description of our two objectives
and we leverage mathematical method to get optimal values of different
duty cycle ratios via our objectives. In Section 7.4, we report and discuss
the result of the simulation. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 7.5.
7.1 Related Work
With the development of Internet technology and Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs), a new paradigm for communication called Internet of Things is
emerging in the era of ubiquity [212]. IoT network is full of smart “network
enabled” objects, such as, smartphones, smart vehicles, buildings and other
items embedded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators. Such smart
objects have capabilities of sensing, acting, communicating, and processing
advanced signal and information. IoT sensors play an important role in
collecting, sending, and receiving a significant amount of data. Sensing and
transmitting data are also key capabilities of WSNs. Therefore, most of
the problems regarding the energy consumption in WSNs are inherited by
IoT paradigms as well. In recent years, researchers have proposed numerous
approaches aiming at optimizing energy consumption. The authors in [213]
are the first to study how to avoid energy hole problem in WSNs. They pro-
posed an energy consumption model governed by E = dα+ c, where d is the
transmission range, α is energy consumption coefficient and c is a positive
constant parameter. They proved in theory that uneven energy depletion
can be avoided when the width of all the coronas are same. C. Song et al.
in [214] assigned different transmission ranges for different nodes to avoid
energy hole problem. Based on the work [214], the authors in [215] found the
optimal transmission path between each node and sink through ant colony
algorithm. X. Wu et al. in [204] investigated the theoretical aspects of the
non-uniform node distribution strategy. In particular, they regulated the
number of nodes in each corona and derive the ratio q between the node
densities in the adjacent i + 1th and ith coronas by the strategy. How-
ever, they did not consider the energy consumption in network construction
phase and idle listening consumption in data processing phase. The authors
in [216, 217] proposed their own algorithm to find the most energy-efficient
path to the sink for processing and storing data collected from sensors.
Although all the aforementioned literature tried to solve the energy hole
problem, some of them did not take the energy consumption caused by idle
listening into consideration (e.g., [218]). In many scenarios, sensor nodes
usually spend a considerable proportion of energy for monitoring the en-
vironment without communication, hence, the energy consumption of idle
listening cannot be ignored. In order to reduce the energy consumption of
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idle listening and balance energy consumption in different layers, the pro-
tocols of WSNs usually adopted duty cycle operation, which means nodes’
working pattern alternates between sleeping and active mode. M. Medidi
and Y. Zhou in [208] assigned different duty cycle ratios for nodes according
to the distances from the sink. However, this model did not consider energy
consumption caused in network construction phase, and did not rely on the
clustering architecture that is efficient in energy conservation in a large scale
network. Compared to the existing approaches, EnergIoT strategy proposed
in this chapter not only considers energy consumption in network construc-
tion phase and data processing phase based on the hierarchical clustering
structure, but it also assigns different duty cycle ratios for nodes to balance
the energy consumption to cope with energy hole problem.
7.2 Model for EnergIoT
In order to present our EnergIoT, a hierarchical clustering approach based
on different duty cycle ratios to improve the energy efficiency of a network
of IoT devices, we introduce the network structure model for EnergIoT in
Section 7.2.1. Based on the network structure, network lifetime is divided
into network construction phase and data processing phase in EnergIoT (de-
tails in Section 7.2.2). In Section 7.2.3, we illustrate the energy model for
calculating the energy consumption.
7.2.1 Network Structure Model
We assume that all the nodes are distributed in an area where the sink
is located at the center of the network. All the sensor nodes are distributed
within a distance R from the sink. The density of node distribution is ρ
and the width of each layer is r that is the maximum transmission radius of
sensors. We divide the network into m layers and set the ID of sink layer
as 0, the ID of the outermost layer as m and so on. Since the maximum
transmission range of a sensor node is r, the network is composed of a set
of concentric coronas whose width is r. The data generated by nodes whose
distance from the sink is larger than r is transmitted to the sink by multi-hop
forwarding.
In EnergIoT, we manage and coordinate the nodes by leveraging hierar-
chical clustering architecture. Figure 7.2 shows the hierarchical clustering
architecture. For ease of exposition, we show only a part of a whole network.
A cluster consists of a cluster head (CH) and several cluster nodes (CNs).
In particular, CNs are located in the same layer, exactly within the trans-
mission range of the CH. CH is responsible for forwarding data gathered by
its CNs to its inner layers’ CH. Based on this structure, a node could play
different roles in different clusters. For example, node a, located at layer 2,
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acts as (i) a CH to receive data from its CNs located at layer 3, and (ii)
a CN to transmit traffic to its CH located in layer 1. Recalling that a CH
acts as a forwarder, we assume the ratio of the number of CH to the total
CNs as µ. Moreover, each source node generates and sends λ bits of data
per unit time.
layer 3
layer 2
Sink layer 1
a
cluster head
cluster node
Figure 7.2: Hierarchical clustering architecture.
7.2.2 Network Workflow
Based on the above hierarchical clustering architecture, we give a de-
scription of the network workflow. The lifetime of the network consists of
several rounds. When the number of dead sensor nodes (run out of energy)
is larger than a threshold, the sink node starts the next round to “refresh”
the network construction phase (see details in Section 7.2.2). Besides, each
round includes two phases: network construction phase and data processing
phase.
Network construction phase
During the network construction phase, EnergIoT uses multiple iterations
to discover all the sensor nodes, and forms a hierarchical clustering architec-
ture. The procedure of network construction phase is shown in Figure 7.3.
In each iteration, nodes at layer i broadcast VH (Vie cluster Head) messages
within range r to vie to be CH. A VH message includes the following infor-
mation: remaining energy of the node and the identifier of the layer where
the node is located (Step 1). Once a node located at layer i+ 1 receives VH
messages from several CH candidates, it chooses the closest one and remains
the more energy to be its CH. Then, the node sends a SH (Selecting cluster
Head) message to the selected CH candidate (Step 2). The selected CH
candidate at layer i replies AH (Ack cluster Head) messages to the nodes
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Start
(i=1)
Nodes at layer i broadcast VH messages within 
range r.
Once receiving VH messages, nodes at layer i+1 
select candidate CH and send SH messages to CH.
Each CH at layer i replies AH messages to the CNs 
to confirm its identity.
i=
i+
1
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Figure 7.3: Procedure of network construction.
who are located at layer i + 1 and selects the candidate CH as their CH
(Step 3).
Nodes at layer i+1 broadcast VH messages to nodes at layer i+2 to start
a new iteration. Similarly, other CHs are found in different layers. Finally,
in EnergIoT, after the network construction phase, we have the network
where nodes are partitioned into layers according to their distances to the
sink.
Data processing phase
During the data processing phase, each node in the network has two modes:
active and sleep. In active mode, nodes consume energy to sense (i.e., idle
listening), receive and transmit data. While in sleep mode, nodes are able
to reduce energy consumption by turning off the sensing function. The duty
cycle ratio γ, is defined as follows [205]:
γ =
Tactive
Tactive + Tsleep
where Tactive represents the duration of active mode and Tsleep is the duration
of sleep mode. Note that, we can only adjust the duty cycle of a node
by varying Tsleep, since Tactive is fixed in order to guarantee receiving and
transmitting network package [219].
7.2.3 Energy Consumption Model
108
Human-Computer Interaction: Security Aspects Q. Li
In this section, we discuss the model for the possible energy consumption
in EnergIoT. We assume that sensor nodes have the same initial energy, and
the power of the sink is unlimited. First, we list the following types of energy
consumption during data processing phase:
• Egl: the average energy consumed for idle listening (active mode) in
one unit time;
• Egr: the average energy consumed for receiving data in one unit time;
• Egs: the average energy consumed for transmitting data in one unit
time.
In particular, Egl is controlled by the duty cycle γ, the equation is listed in
Eq. (7.1).
Egl = γeidle. (7.1)
Here, eidle denotes a node’s energy consumption for idle listening in per unit
time [218]. Moreover, we set the value of eidle to 0.88mJ/s for our Ener-
gIoT. In order to calculate the energy consumption of sending and receiving
packets (Egr and Egs), we list two basic formulas. The consumed energy in
receiving l-bit data is shown in Eq. (7.2) and the consumed energy in sending
l-bit data over a distance r is given by Eq. (7.3). Similar to the work [220],
we assume a simple model where the radio dissipates Eelec = 50nJ/bit to
run the transmitter or receiver circuitry.
Egr = lEelec. (7.2)
Egs = l(Eelec + εr
α). (7.3)
Second, we consider the following two types of energy consumption in net-
work construction phase:
• Ecl: the energy consumed for idle listening in one unit time.
• Ecsr: the energy consumed for receiving and transmitting messages
(i.e., VH, SH and AH messages as described in Section 7.2.2) in one
unit time.
In the following section, we illustrate concretely how to calculate the energy
consumption in different layers and balance energy consumption among dif-
ferent layers.
7.3 Energy Consumption Optimization in Ener-
gIoT
In this section, based on the network structure and energy model, we illus-
trate the main design of EnergIoT. In detail, we describe two objectives in
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Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.2, respectively. According to the objectives,
we take methods to find the optimal value of different duty cycle ratios for
each layer in Section 7.3.3.
7.3.1 Balancing Energy Consumption
In order to accomplish this objective, we need to calculate the different type
energy consumption of each layer’s nodes in EnergIoT according to the order
shown in Section 7.2.3.
We use Eigl to represent the average idle listening energy consumption
of CH in layer i in one unit time during data processing phase. The energy
consumption for idle listening is also up to the ratio of CH. In EnergIoT, we
assign different duty cycles for nodes at different layers. The duty cycle of
a node at layer i is γi, and hence we have:
Eigl = µγieidle. (7.4)
We denote Eigr as the average energy consumption of each node for re-
ceiving data at layer i in one unit time. In EnergIoT, a node at layer i
receives data collected from all outer layers (i.e., from i+ 1th layer to mth
layer). As shown in Figure 7.4(a), nodes in area Si receive data generated
from the nodes in area Sr. Note that, Sr includes one or more layers. Thus,
according to Eq. (7.2), Eigr can be calculated as Eq. (7.5).
Sr
Sink
Si
(a) Si is in charge of receiving data
from nodes in Sr.
Ss
Si
Sink
(b) Si is in charge of sending data
generated by nodes in Ss.
Figure 7.4: Diagram to show areas Si, Sr, and Ss.
Eigr = lEelec =
Srρλ
Siρµ
Eelec =
pi[(mr)2 − (ir)2]ρλ
pi[(ir)2 − ((i− 1)r)2]ρµEelec
=
λ(m2 − i2)
µ(2i− 1) Eelec (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
(7.5)
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Here, Srρλ represents the data generated by the nodes in area Sr in one
unit time. Siρµ is the number of CH responsible for receiving data in area
Si. Hence,
Srρλ
Siρµ
is the average data received by each CH in area Si in one
unit time.
We use Eigs to express the average energy consumption of a CH node for
transmitting data at layer i in one unit time. In EnergIoT, CHs at layer i
not only transmit data generated by themselves, but also forward the data
generated by nodes from all outer layers. As shown in Figure 7.4(b), nodes
in area Si transmit data generated by nodes from Ss that includes area Si.
Therefore, according to Eq. (7.3), Eigs can be calculated as follows:
Eigs = l(Eelec + εr
α) =
Ssρλ
Siρµ
(Eelec + εr
α)
=
pi[(mr)2 − ((i− 1)r)2]ρλ
pi[(ir)2 − ((i− 1)r)2]ρµ (Eelec + εr
α)
=
λ[m2 − (i− 1)2]
µ(2i− 1) (Eelec + εr
α) (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
(7.6)
Here, Ssρλ represents the data generated by the nodes in area Ss in one
unit time. Siρµ denotes the number of nodes responsible for transmitting
data in area Si. Hence,
Ssρλ
Siρµ
is the average data sent by each CH in area Si
in one unit time.
We denote Eicl as the average idle listening energy consumption of CH
node at layer i in one unit time during network construction phase. As
described in Section 7.2.2, during the cluster construction, nodes send VH
messages to outer layers. Once these nodes send AH message to confirm that
they are CHs, they enter into sleep mode. Therefore, we have Eq. (7.7):
Eicl =
i
m− 1eidle 1 ≤ i ≤ m. (7.7)
There arem−1 rounds to choose the CHs during network construction phase.
Nodes in layer i need to wait for i rounds until they send AH message and
enter into sleep mode.
We use Ei to denote the average energy consumption per unit time of a
CH node in layer i in EnergIoT, and here we describe it in Eq. (7.8).
Ei = E
i
gl + E
i
gr + E
i
gs + E
i
cl + E
i
csr
= µγieidle +
λ(m2 − i2)
µ(2i− 1) Eelec +
λ[m2 − (i− 1)2]
µ(2i− 1) (Eelec + εr
α)
+
i
m− 1eidle + E
i
csr (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
(7.8)
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Because of the energy hole phenomenon, we try to balance the energy con-
sumption among different layers’ CH nodes using the Eq. (7.9) to prolong
network lifetime.
Ei ≈ Ei+1. (7.9)
It is deserved to notice that, during the network construction phase, the
number of sending and receiving messages by nodes at different layers is
same. The expression in equation is Eicsr = E
i+1
csr , hence the expansion of
Eq. (7.9) is as follows.
Eigl + E
i
gr + E
i
gs + E
i
cl ≈ Ei+1gl + Ei+1gr + Ei+1gs + Ei+1cl . (7.10)
7.3.2 Maintaining Network Performance
In order to guarantee the network performance after introducing EnergIoT,
we should keep the same end-to-end delay as that of uniform duty cycle
approach. In both of EnergIoT and uniform duty cycle approach, the end-
to-end delay consists of the setup latency and the transmission delay. We
try to analyze the delay of a packet sent from the outermost layer, because
the end-to-end delay of this situation is highest. As we mentioned in Sec-
tion 7.2.1, the duty cycle ratios of nodes are controlled by varying the sleep
interval Tsleep. The active period Tactive is fixed for each node in order to
ensure receiving data packets. Therefore, a node with value of duty cycle γi
generates a setup latency Tst [219]. Tst = Tsleep/2K = Tactive(1− γi)/2Kγi,
where K is the average number of forwarders each sender have. K is set to
1 according to our structure model in Section 7.2.1.
We use De, Du to represent the end-to-end delay in EnergIoT and uni-
form duty cycle ratio approach, respectively. T ist is the setup latency for
layer i, while Ttran is the transmission delay of sending a packet from layer
i to i+ 1. Therefore, De and Du can be represented as follows:
De =
m∑
i=1
T ist +mTtran = Tactive
m∑
i=1
1− γi
2γi
+mTtran, (7.11)
Du =
m∑
i=1
T ist +mTtran = mTactive
1− γ
2γ
+mTtran. (7.12)
In order to maintain network performance of end-to-end delay in EnergIoT
with uniform duty cycle ratios approach, we must make sure that the end-
to-end delay in EnergIoT is less than or equal to that in uniform duty cycle
ratio approach. Thus, we have Eq. (7.13):
De 6 Du ⇒ m1− γ
γ
6
m∑
i=1
1− γi
γi
. (7.13)
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We can notice density node distribution ρ is canceled out from Eq. (7.10)
and (7.13), hence the optimization of energy consumption has nothing to do
with ρ.
7.3.3 Value of Different Duty Cycle Ratios
In this section, we formulate optimization problem to find the optimal dif-
ferent duty cycle ratios to achieve the objectives mentioned in Section 7.3.1
and 7.3.2. We have two conditions provided in Eq. (7.10) and (7.13) for γi.
As our prime objective is to improve the energy efficiency, we formulate our
objective function based on energy criteria and constraint function based on
the end-to-end delay. Therefore, we try to calculate the minimal value of our
objective function (Eq. (7.14)) such that the optimal value of γi can satisfy
constraint function (Eq. (7.15)). The constrained optimization problem is
expressed as
min
γ1,γ2,...,γm
f(γ1, γ2, ..., γm) =
m∑
i=1
(Ei − Ei+1)2, (7.14)
such that
m
1− γ
γ
6
m∑
i=1
1− γi
γi
. (7.15)
Relying on Lagrange Multiplier [221, 222], we find the optimal values for
variables (γ1, γ2, ..., γm) and satisfy our constraint at the same time.
We observe that the closer the nodes to the sink, the smaller the the
duty cycle ratio. Because the nodes closer to the sink spend more energy to
forward and receive the data, they need more time for sleep mode. According
to the definition of γ, under the condition of fixed Tactive, the nodes closer to
sink have a smaller value for duty cycle ratios. EnergIoT effectively mitigates
the problem of unbalanced energy consumption, which is also demonstrated
in our experiments (discussed in Section 7.4).
7.4 Simulation Analysis
In this section, we carry out extensive simulations to validate the effective-
ness of EnergIoT. In particular, we compare EnergIoT with the approach
without duty cycle mechanism (we refer this approach as full-active ap-
proach in the following), as well as the approach with uniform duty cycle
ratios (we refer this approach as uniform approach in the following). The
fixed duty cycle of uniform approach is 2% in the simulation. Our simula-
tion is performed by Castalia Emulator [223] on OMNeT++ platform [224].
The metrics used in the simulation are shown in Table 7.1.
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In the following, we first compare the lifetime of the network in three
strategies. Then we show the percentage of remaining energy in different
layers of the network for these three approaches. At last, we give a descrip-
tion of the end-to-end delay in different layers of the network. Moreover, we
report the average results obtained from 50 simulation experiments and the
figures are with 95% confidence interval error bars.
Table 7.1: Parameters in EnergIoT’s simulation scenario.
Model Parameter Value
Energy Model
Eelec 50nJ/bit
α 2
ε 100pJ/bit/m2
eidle 0.88mJ/s
γ 2%
Initial energy of each node 10.8 ∗ 103J
Network Model
r 20m
R 200m
m 10
µ 20%
ρ 60/m2
λ 400bps
7.4.1 Lifetime Analysis
The average lifetime of the network in EnergIoT, uniform approach and
full-active approach is around 361.42 hours, 272.87 hours and 53.3 hours,
respectively. The result shows that the approaches deployed with duty cycle
could significantly prolong the lifetime of the network. The reason is that,
in EnergIoT and uniform approach, nodes turn off the sensing function
and enter into sleeping mode periodically, which contributes to reducing the
energy consumption. However, in full-active approach, the nodes closest
to sink deplete their energy so quickly that the network ends the life soon.
Although the uniform approach achieves the aim of energy conservation,
it sacrifices the end-to-end delay (details in Section 7.4.3). Moreover, the
network lifetime with EnergIoT strategy extends 32% compared with that
of uniform approach. Since the energy consumption of nodes in different
layers is balanced by introducing different duty cycle ratios, the network
will not end prematurely because of energy hole phenomenon.
7.4.2 Energy Remaining in Different Layers
As a result of our experiment, we highlight in Figure 7.5 how EnergIoT
outperforms the other two approaches in terms of energy efficiency. Indeed,
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the energy efficiency of a network is given by the percentage of remaining
energy in its nodes. As shown in Figure 7.5, the percentage of remaining
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of percentage of remaining energy.
energy increases with the increasing ID in these three approaches. In both
of uniform approach and full-active approach, the percentage of remaining
energy is almost 80% and 45% respectively for most of the layers while
the first layer nodes run out of their energy. However, when the layer ID
increases, in EnergIoT, the percentage of remaining energy fluctuates around
20% for almost all layers except the first and second layers. We can conclude
that the energy consumption is balanced well through different duty cycle
ratios. The nodes located at inner layers (closer to the sink) are responsible
for receiving and transmitting more traffic loads. If we do not take measure
to balance the energy consumption, the inner nodes will deplete energy
quickly, which leads to the outer layers’ nodes remaining amount of energy
(i.e., 45%, 80%). It is a waste for the outer layers nodes to remain such
amount of energy.
In EnergIoT, we deploy different duty cycle ratios for nodes in different
layers. In particular, the nodes in the inner layer have smaller duty cycle
ratios, which represents that the nodes can sleep more time when it is not
in active mode. As we discussed in Eq. (7.10) and (7.13), the energy con-
sumption in different layers is approximately same by tuning the duty cycle
ratios. Moreover, the remaining energy of nodes with full-active approach is
still more or less 80%. The reason for this phenomenon is that the full-active
approach does not consider turning off the sensing model of nodes. Hence,
the inner layers’ nodes are easily and quickly run out of their energy.
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7.4.3 End-to-End Delay Analysis
End-to-end delay consists of time to transmit packets from a source to the
destination and the latency of setting up duty cycle ratios for different layers’
nodes. In our simulation, we report the average end-to-end delay, which
represents delay performance. Figure 7.6 shows the end-to-end comparison
among EnergIoT, uniform approach, full-active approach. As shown in
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Figure 7.6: Comparison of end-to-end delay.
Figure 7.6, the end-to-end delay of the network with full-active approach
is less than the network with duty cycle-based approaches. One reason is
that, with full-active approach, nodes spend all time in the idle listening
mode instead of sleeping mode. Therefore, nodes with full-active approach
can response the traffic once such traffic arrives without wasting much time.
The other reason is that, the latency for setting up duty cycle is 0, since
γ is 1 (Section 7.3.2). However, in duty cycle-based approaches, the nodes
might be in the sleep mode when the traffic arrives, which means nodes
cannot respond immediately to any traffic.
The end-to-end delay in both EnergIoT and uniform approach is more or
less similar as shown in Figure 7.6. We can deduce that EnergIoT achieves
the target of extending network lifetime of IoT devices without sacrificing
network performance compared to uniform approach. The simulation re-
sult confirms that EnergIoT efficiently improves network lifetime without
prolonging end-to-end delay. In addition, Figure 7.6 shows that the nodes
located at outer layers have longer end-to-end delay compared with nodes in
the inner layers (i.e., the end-to-end delay increases with the increasing ID).
EnergIoT is a differential duty cycle approach based on hierarchical cluster-
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ing architecture. The network is composed of multiple clusters consisting of
CH and CNs. The CNs send the packets to their CH directly. Therefore,
nodes at outer layers need more forwarders to transmit packets. As a result,
the end-to-end delay of nodes at outer layers is larger.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed EnergIoT, a hierarchical clustering approach,
based on different duty cycle ratios to maximize the lifetime of IoT network
of battery-powered devices, under the condition of maintaining the network
performance. In particular, we assigned the different duty cycle ratios to
nodes according to their different distance from the sink. First, the energy
consumption of the battery-powered devices are balanced especially for the
innermost layer and outermost layer, which avoids the energy hole problem.
Second, EnergIoT keeps the network performance (i.e., delay) the same as
uniform duty cycle approach. Moreover, we modeled the energy consump-
tion considering both data processing phase and network construction phase
based on a hierarchical clustering network structure. We assessed EnergIoT
through extensive simulation-based analyses on the OMNet++ platform.
The results showed that EnergIoT is feasible and efficient. EnergIoT is
able to improve the lifetime of IoT network by 32%, when compared to the
approach applied with uniform duty cycle, without degrading the network
performance.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Considerable researches have been carried out and major advances have
been made in the area of Human-Computer Interaction. Information se-
curity and authentication are becoming increasingly important and more
complex as business is conducted electronically. However, the state-of-the-
art of security-related development still needs to be improved in the aspect
of HCI. The objective of this dissertation is to promote and enable security
awareness of end-users in their interaction with computer systems.
In this dissertation, we presented our contribution in security aspects
of HCI. In what follows, we summarize our contribution (Section 8.1), and
discuss future research directions (Section 8.2).
8.1 Summary of Contribution
We described the contributions of this dissertation in three parts: (1) an
illustration of HCI-based authentication and a keystroke dynamics based
identification of users; (2) a study of HCI impact on network traffic and a
framework, GolfEngine, for managing such network traffic to ensure network
without malicious attack of human behavior; and (3) a proposal, EnergIoT,
for avoiding energy exhaustion attacks and further extending the lifetime of
networks of battery-powered IoT smart devices.
8.1.1 Security Issues in User Interaction with Devices
Part I presented our work about the security challenge of authentication
users on smart devices. In particular, we designed a tool based on keystroke
dynamics to detect users’ deceptive information.
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• HCI-based Authentication for Smartphones: Chapter 2 surveyed the
state-of-the-art of authentication methods on smartphones that are
based on HCI. First, we categorized authentication methods according
to the nature of biometrics features, which are measured by smart-
phone sensors, into behavioral and physiological. Physiological bio-
metrics are related to users’ characteristics, while behavioral biomet-
rics are related to the way a user interacts with her smartphone. Sec-
ond, we categorized the behavioral authentication methods into two
types according to the number of time required to collect data from
users and authenticating. Finally, we discussed the future research
directions of biometrics authentication methods on smartphones.
• HCI-based Security Challenges in Brain-Computer Interfaces: BCI is
deployed to translate the brain activity to signals that can be used
to control computers or communication devices. In Chapter 3, we
surveyed main common brain-computer interfaces (BCI) applications
and categorized them into four different application scenarios: (1) neu-
romedical applications; (2) user authentication; (3) gaming and enter-
tainment; and (4) smartphone-based applications. For each scenario,
we provide detailed description of the state-of-the-art technologies, po-
tential attacks that might threat each scenario, and envisaged coun-
termeasures.
• Detecting Deceitful Users via Keystroke Dynamics: Interacting with
a computer in a natural way is a key issue for decades. The most
commonly known interfaces to control computer and other devices
are keyboards. In Chapter 4, we presented a new method based on
keystroke dynamics to distinguish between fake and truthful personal
information written via a computer keyboard. Our authentication
method reached an overall accuracy of 76% in the classification of a
single answer as truthful or deceptive.
8.1.2 HCI Impact on Network Traffic
Part II illustrated the influence of the users’ behavior on network traffic
and proposed an architecture to manage such network traffic efficiently and
securely.
• Analysis of Network Traffic on Mobile Devices: We reviewed the work
in Chapter 5 that contributes to the state of the art of network traffic
analysis targeting mobile devices. In particular, we present a system-
atic classification of the work in the literature according to three crite-
ria: (i) the goal of the analysis; (ii) the point where the network traffic
is captured; and (iii) the targeted mobile platforms. In particular, we
illustrate detailed the goal of the analysis related to Human-Computer
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Interaction. We believe our survey will be an important reference work
for researchers and practitioners in this research field.
• Network Traffic Management via SDN: In Chapter 6, we proposed
an innovative framework named GolfEngine, based on SDN, to sim-
plify the management of network traffic and deployment of security
applications to manage the user behavior. GolfEngine provided bet-
ter visibility to dominate tasks for performing network anomalies on
demand. In addition, GolfEngine provided function of checking pol-
icy conflicts when users design their own security applications. Fur-
thermore, our GolfEngine provided the mechanism to check possible
redundancies on data storage of network traffic generated by human
behavior, which improved the network security application efficiency.
Moreover, we evaluated the performance and execution efficiency of
GolfEngine through a security use case (i.e., Firewall) implementation.
The results of our simulation underlined that GolfEngine contributes
significantly in improving the efficiency and security of management
HCI impact on network.
8.1.3 Energy-Efficient Communication of IoT Devices
In part III, in Chapter 7, we proposed EnergIoT, a hierarchical cluster-
ing approach based on duty cycle ratio to maximize network lifetime of
battery-powered HCI based devices. In particular, EnergIoT is designed
to automatically assign different duty cycle ratios to devices according to
their distance from the sink, since different duty cycle ratios balance the
energy consumption among devices at different layers. Furthermore, we
calculated the energy consumption of HCI based devices, considering both
network construction phase and data processing phase. We evaluated En-
ergIoT through extensive simulation analyses on the OMNet++ platform.
The result showed that EnergIoT was not only feasible but also efficient.
Moreover, EnergIoT improved the network lifetime of IoT smart devices by
32%, compared to the uniform duty cycle approach, without sacrificing the
network performance (i.e., end-to-end delay).
8.2 Future Work
In this section, we discuss possible future developments that naturally follow
from the research contribution presented in this dissertation.
8.2.1 Security Issues in User Interaction with Devices
• HCI-based Security Challenges in Brain-Computer Interfaces: In
Chapter 3, we pointed out the current attacks and corresponding mea-
surements for each scenario’s BCI applications. In order to strengthen
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the security aspects of BCI, we intend to focus on countermeasures to
prevent the use of BCI capabilities to perpetrate user privacy attacks.
As shown in Figure 8.1, our idea is to add a process named ”BCI
Protector” between the signal acquisition and signal digitization. The
core design of BCI protector is to make a synthetic signal by combin-
ing the raw brain signal with a regular wave (such as sine or cosine
wave). In this way, the attackers cannot recognize the raw signal from
synthetic signal.
1
3 4
5
2
Figure 8.1: The mechanism to prevent attacks for BCI.
• Detecting Deceitful Users via Keystroke Dynamics: In Chapter 4
proved that keystroke analysis had a great potential in detecting the
veracity of self-declared personal information. In order to enforce the
authentication when interacting with the keyboard, our future work
will try to combine the brain activities information together with the
keystroke dynamics as user behavior data for authentication. More-
over, we will investigate the feasibility to carry out false information
to rely on brain activity data provided by the devices described in
Chapter 3.
8.2.2 HCI Impact on Network traffic
The management architecture of network traffic generated by users’ inter-
action with smart devices was introduced in Chapter 6. Future work is
focused on two main directions. On one hand, analyzing the data provided
by the database of ”User Information”, we aim at predicting users’ behavior,
being able to design in advance security applications that prevent possible
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errors and attacks. On the other hand, in the future, we intend to face the
challenges on multi-domain network traffic.
8.2.3 Energy-Efficient Communication of IoT Devices
As a future work for our proposal in Chapter 7, we will further investigate
the impact of each component on the overall performance in terms of energy
consumption and communication delay reduction. In particular, we intend
to run ad-hoc simulations to adjust the percentage of CHs in a network.
Moreover, we would like to evaluate the efficiency of our proposal in a real-
world IoT testbed.
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